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1 
INTRODUCTION 
  Over  the  past  few  decades,  changes  in  market  conditions  such  as  globalisation  and 
deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have 
induced financial institutions
1 to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries 
and  to  engage  in  cross-sectoral  operations.
2 As  combining  different  sectoral  businesses  offers 
opportunities  for  operational  synergies  and  diversification  benefits,  financial  groups  comprising 
banks
3 ,  insurance  undertakings  and/or  investment  firms,  usually  referred  to  as  financial 
conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct 
financial  sectors  and  oftentimes  in  different  geographic  locations.
4 In  the  European  Union  (EU), 
financial  conglomerates  have  become  part  of  the  biggest  and  most  active  financial  market 
participants in recent years.
5  
  Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can 
raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones.
6 In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can 
involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising 
from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well 
as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can 
entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a 
whole.
7  
  Until  a  few  years  ago,  there  was  no  supervisory  framework  in  place  which  addressed  a 
financial  conglomerate  in  its  entirety  as  a  group.  Instead,  each  group  entity  within  a  financial 
conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory 
approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. 
It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with 
each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential 
supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates 
Directive 2002/87/EC
8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the 
member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years 
beginning on 1 January 2005 and after.  
  The  FCD  primarily  aims  at  supplementing  the  existing  sectoral  directives  to  address  the 
additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It 
therefore  provides  for  a  supervisory  framework,  which  is  applicable  in  addition  to  the  sectoral 
supervision.  Most  importantly,  the  FCD  has  introduced  additional  capital  requirements  at  the 
conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. 
                                                 
1   The term financial institution employed in this paper, unless explicitly defined otherwise, refers to all institutions that 
provide financial services and products, including banks, insurance undertakings and investment firms.  
2   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 26; Joint Forum (2001a), p. 5; BoJ (2005), p. 5. 
3   The terms bank and credit institution are used interchangeably in this paper. 
4   Tripartite Group (1995), paras. 26-27. 
5   From 2001 to 2005, the market share of financial conglomerates increased from 57 % to 69 %. Market in this context 
is composed of the balance sheet totals of the largest 25 banks, insurance undertakings and financial conglomerates 
in the EU (source: Schilder (2007), p. 3). In 2009, financial conglomerates represented approximately 70 % of the 
banking and insurance businesses in the EU (source: Patrick Brady, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Financial 
Conglomerates, speech held at the High Level Conference “Towards a new supervisory architecture in Europe” on 7 
May 2009 in Brussels).  
6   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 29; European Commission (2001), explanatory note, p. 2; Walker (2001), p. 176. 
7   In particular, the 2007-2009 crisis has demonstrated that the failure or financial difficulties of financial conglomerates 
(e.g. Fortis, ING, AIG, Citigroup) can pose a systemic risk or externality to the entire financial system.  
8   Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and 
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and 
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 035, 11.02.2003, pp. 1-27.  
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  This  paper  seeks  to  examine  to  what  extent  the  FCD  provides  for  an  adequate  capital 
regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral 
capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates.  
  In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be 
presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial 
conglomeration  (II)  and  an  overview  of  the  development  of  the  supervision  over  financial 
conglomerates in the EU (III).  
  Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general 
overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. 
A  delineation  of  the  commonalities  and  differences  of  the  banking  and  the  insurance  capital 
requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital 
regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In 
this  context,  the  technical  advice  rendered  by  the  Joint  Committee  on  Financial  Conglomerates 
(JCFC)
9 as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The 
paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV). 
 
PART 1: FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES IN THE EU 
  In search of new business opportunities and operational synergies, financial institutions have 
increasingly pursued a cross-sectoral business strategy in the past, materialising the benefits of a 
one-stop shopping for financial services and creating more convenience for consumers.  
  There  are  various  ways  of  accomplishing  cross-sectoral  business  expansions.  Financial 
institutions can opt for mere cooperation or collaboration with non-related companies by entering 
into cross-selling agreements or by forming a strategic alliance. Alternatively, they can embed the 
new business operation into their own corporate structure and exert control over it. The commercial 
motives and objectives behind a cross-sectoral business strategy can be achieved by diverse forms of 
alliance, depending on the preferred structural set-up and the desired level of synergy. However, 
only  the  second  form  of  alliance,  which  puts  cross-sectoral  activities  under  common  corporate 
control, results in financial conglomeration and is therefore of supervisory relevance. 
 
I.  What is a financial conglomerate? 
  A financial conglomerate is generally defined as “any group of companies under common 
control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least 
two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance)”.
10 According to this definition, even 
the  slightest  activity  in  at  least  two  sectors  would  classify  a  financial  group  as  a  financial 
conglomerate. For European prudential purposes, the definition of a financial conglomerate is more 
restrictive than the above definition.  
 
1.  Definition under the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
  Article 2(14) FCD defines a financial conglomerate as a group which meets the following 
conditions: 
(a)  at least one regulated entity in the EU must be present in the group; 
(b)  if  the  group  is  headed  by  a  regulated  entity,  it  must  either  be  the  parent  of,  hold  a 
participation in, or be linked through a horizontal group with an entity in the financial sector;  
                                                 
9   Formerly known as the Interim Working Committee on Financial Conglomerates (IWCFC). The IWCFC was renamed as 
JCFC, effective from 29 January 2009, European Commission Decisions 2009/78/EC and 2009/79/EC. 
10   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 36.   
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(c)  if the group is not headed by a regulated entity, the group’s activities must occur mainly in 
the financial sector;  
(d)  the group comprises at least one insurance undertaking and at least one entity within the 
banking or the investment services sectors;  
(e)  the  consolidated  and/or  aggregated  activities  of  the  entities  in  the  group  within  the 
insurance sector and those of the entities in the banking and the investment services sector 
are both significant.  
 
  As regards (a), a regulated entity means a credit institution, an insurance undertaking or an 
investment  firm  (Article  2(4)  FCD).  The  supplementary  nature  of  the  FCD  requires  at  least  one 
sectorally regulated entity.  
  As regards (b), a group is a set of undertakings, which consists of a parent undertaking, its 
subsidiaries and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation
11 
as well as undertakings linked through a horizontal relation
12 (Article 2(12) FCD). 
  As regards (c), a group’s activities occur mainly in the financial sector if more than 40 percent 
of the aggregated or consolidated balance sheet total of the entire group is attributable to the 
regulated or non-regulated financial sector entities (Article 3(1) FCD). Financial sector in this case 
comprises the banking, insurance and investment services sectors. 
  As regards (d), only two sectors are considered for the assessment of cross-sectoral activities, 
namely the insurance sector and the banking/investment services sector. Mere bank-investment 
firms thus do not qualify as a financial conglomerate as consolidated supervision of banking and 
investment  services  under  one  roof  is  already  applied  under  banking  supervision.  It  is  not  a 
prerequisite that the group holds a regulated entity in each sector.  
  As regards (e), the activities in each financial sector must be respectively significant. The 
banking sector and the investment services sector are considered to be one financial sector in this 
context. There are two quantitative criteria at hand to determine the said significance:  
The activities of a group are significant if the average of the ratio of both the balance sheet 
total and the solvency requirements of each financial sector entity in the group exceeds 10 percent 
of the balance sheet total and the solvency requirements of all financial sector entities in the group 
(Article 3(2) FCD).  
Alternatively, cross-sectoral activities are presumed to be significant if the balance sheet 
total of the smallest financial sector entity in the group exceeds EUR 6 billion (Article 3(3) FCD). 
However,  in  case  the  first  relative  quantitative  criterion  is  not  met  but  the  second  absolute 
quantitative criterion (the EUR 6 billion threshold) is fulfilled, the relevant competent authorities
13 
may decide not to regard the group as a financial conglomerate if they believe that the inclusion of 
the group in the scope of the FCD is not necessary or would be inappropriate or misleading with 
respect to the objectives of the FCD while taking into account the size and the market share of the 
smallest financial sector of the concerned financial group (Article 3(3) FCD). 
  Further, the relevant competent authorities may replace the second quantitative criterion 
pertaining  to  the  balance  sheet  total  with  the  income  structure  and/or  the  off-balance  sheet 
activities of a group in an exceptional case and by common agreement if they believe that these 
parameters are of particular relevance for the purposes of supplementary supervision (Article 3(5) 
                                                 
11   Participation (Article 2(11) FCD) means the ownership, direct or by way of control, of at least 20% of the voting rights 
or capital of an undertaking or of less than 20% if there is a durable link as defined in the Fourth Council Directive 
(78/660/EEC) of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of certain types of companies. 
12   As defined in Article 2(12) FCD by reference to Article 12(1) of the Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 
1983 on consolidated accounts. 
13   Defined in Article 2(17) FCD.  
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FCD). The FCD neither provides for a definition of the term income structure
14 nor suggests any 
criteria that could justify an exceptional case and hence gives some leeway in interpretation to the 
national authorities.  
  The classification of a group as a financial conglomerate is conducted by the competent 
authorities in accordance with the process of identification laid down in Article 4(1) FCD. Following 
the identification process, the relevant group is subsequently notified of the decision through the 
notification procedure in Article 4(2) FCD. The notification is considered to be an administrative act 
which generates legal consequences for the concerned group and against which recourse by the 
group is deemed admissible.
15 Once a group has been identified as a financial conglomerate, the 
ratios for the threshold calculations concerning the criteria mainly and significant are slightly reduced 
and a three-year view is taken in order to avoid sudden regime shifts (Article 3(6) FCD). 
 
2.  Basic corporate structures of financial conglomerates 
  There are three basic corporate structures according to which financial conglomerates can be 
organised, namely the parent-subsidiary structure, the holding company structure and the horizontal 
group  structure.
16 In  reality,  financial  conglomerates  assume  a  much  more  complex  corporate 
structure, which often contains a mixture of the basic structures. The high degree of complexity, 
which  is  largely  driven  by  tax,  legal  and  regulatory  concerns,  seems  inevitable  for  financial 
conglomerates, in particular as their legal and managerial structures have to support large scale 
business activities across sectoral boundaries and frequently across national borders.
17  
 
2.1.  Parent-subsidiary structure 
  In a parent-subsidiary structure, the parent company is put at the top level and holds one or 
more subsidiaries. The sectorally distinct business activities are legally and operationally separated 
and put at different corporate levels within the group. This model leads to legal separation and the 
separate capitalisation of group entities. The economic benefits can be limited as the separation 
between  the  distinct  business  fields  can  impede  the  full  realisation  of  potential  synergies  and 
possibly cause agency problems which can arise from different management teams and ownership 
structures.
18  
The legal separation allows the parent company to protect its assets from attempts to seek 
recourse by creditors of financially troubled subsidiaries. In practice, however, the parent company 
may  abstain  from  exploiting  the  advantages  of  the  structural  separation  to  the  full  extent. 
Subsidiaries are often fully integrated into the group without a proper identity of their own and may 
not be perceived as a separate entity in the market. This perception is generally corroborated by 
practices such as the use of consolidated financial statements or the use of a single brand name. In 
consideration  of  such  circumstances,  the  parent  company  may  still  decide  to  cover  for  its 
subsidiaries’ liabilities in order to avoid any negative effects on the group’s overall reputation or on 
other economically relevant items (e.g. future market-funding opportunities).
19  
 
                                                 
14   The MTG defines income structure as referring to “the relative share of each financial sector in the composition of a 
group’s total income according to its profit and loss account for a particular financial year” - an interpretation which is 
binding for all Member States - and deems the use of net income appropriate, see MTG (2005), item 21, p. 9. 
15   MTG (2005), item 26, pp. 11-12. 
16   Article 2(14)(b) FCD. 
17   Tripartite Group (1995), paras. 77-79. 
18   Dierick (2004), p. 18; Half (2002), p. 5. 
19   Dierick (2004), p. 18.  
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2.2.  Holding company structure 
  The holding company structure involves a top company (holding company) which controls a 
number  of  entities  without  its  own  engagement  in  operational  activities.  The  holding  company 
primarily manages common group functions such as risk management, capital raising and allocation, 
IT, and group auditing at the top level. Business operations are carried out by legally distinct entities 
which are held by the holding company. Each group entity has its own management team and capital. 
The core difference to the parent-subsidiary structure lies in the fact that there is no direct capital 
linkage amongst the operational group entities but only an indirect connection through the common 
holding company (potentially unregulated).
20 Hence, in contrast to the parent-subsidiary structure 
where the profits of the subsidiary accrue directly to the parent and the parent’s investment in the 
subsidiary is an asset accessible to the parent’s creditors, none of the group entities held by the 
holding company has direct access to the profits or assets of the other group entities.
21 Financial 
problems in one group entity therefore do not affect other members of the group and present a 
lesser threat to the solvency of the group as a whole.
22 The holding company structure is conducive 
to  the  group’s  overall  financial  solidity  and  offers  a  higher  degree  of  asset  protection  than  the 
parent-subsidary structure. But again, the advantages of the formal separation may be overridden by 
other practical concerns, which have already been indicated in the context of the parent-subsidiary 
structure. 
 
2.3.  Horizontal group structure 
  Under the FCD, a group of corporate entities can still be classified as a financial conglomerate 
without any kind of direct or indirect capital linkage if they are either (i) managed on a unified basis 
pursuant  to  a  contract  or  provisions  in  a  memorandum  or  articles  of  association  or  if  (ii)  the 
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the entities consist for the major part of the 
same persons in office. This corporate structure is referred to as the horizontal group structure and 
has been explicitly provided for in Article 2(14)(b) of the FCD, which in turn refers to the definition of 
the  (horizontal)  relationship  in  Article  12(1)  of  the  Seventh  Council  Directive  (83/349/EEC)  on 
consolidated accounts
 23.  
 
II.  Motives for financial conglomeration 
  New  trends  and  developments  in the  financial  industry over the  past  few  decades  have 
blurred traditional functional dinstinctions amongst financial institutions and created an ever more 
competitive environment. Against this backcloth, financial institutions have discovered and strived 
for the financial and commercial benefits that financial conglomeration can entail.
24 
  One of the main economic benefits represents the possibility to capture potential economies 
of scale and scope and to realise operational synergies.
25 Financial conglomerates typically show a 
high level of complementarity between the products and the services offered by the distinct entities 
within  the  group,  an  economic  advantage  which  often  lacks  in  their  industrial  and  commercial 
counterparts  and  which  can  be  considered  as  a  significant  element  characterising  financial 
conglomerates.
26 A financial conglomerate that combines different sectoral businesses under one 
roof can make use of a wider distribution network and extensive infrastructures (e.g. back office, 
                                                 
20   Dierick (2004), p. 18. 
21   Dierick (2004), p. 18. 
22   See also Half (2002), p. 6. 
23   Seventh Council Directive (83/349/EEC) of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated 
accounts, OJ L 193, 18.07.1983, pp. 1-17. 
24   Herring/Santomero (1990), p. 471.  
25   Walker (2001), p. 176; Mälkönen (2004a), p. 34. 
26   Maycock (1986), p. 2.  
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trading platform, IT departments) to achieve cost and revenue synergies across business lines.
27 The 
combination  of  sectorally  different  financial  services  allows  cross-marketing  and  cross-selling  of 
products and services. It offers opportunities to broaden an institution’s traditional product range 
and customer base while fostering a higher level of innovation in product and service.
28 A source of 
higher  operational  efficiency  can  be  seen  in  information  advantages,  which  allow  financial 
conglomerates to offer a broader set of information-relevant services to their clients by reusing 
relevant  client  information  in  different  business  sectors.
29 Consumers  of  today  expect  from  a 
financial institution such as their house bank to take care of most, if not all, of their financial needs 
and are willing to pay more for one-stop shopping. Induced by this demand in the market, financial 
institutions are more than eager to become “financial supermarkets”, offering banking, investment 
and insurance products altogether.
30 Conglomeration enables to gather a wide array of products and 
to  offer  great  convenience  to  consumers.  It  is  an  important  strategic  aspect  in  strengthening 
customer  loyalty.
31 Additionally,  conglomeration  generally  results  in  the  increase  in  size  and  in 
market  capitalisation  which  allows  financial  institutions  to  secure  their  market  position  and 
discourage unsolicited take-over attempts. 
  Another major driving force behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration can be 
found in potential diversification benefits. Financial conglomerates can generally attain a high degree 
of diversification in revenues and risks as they can distribute their operational activities into different 
financial  sectors.  Spreading  the  risks  and  reducing  earnings  volatility  can  in  turn  reduce  the 
probability of financial distress and the need for external financing.
32 The fact that banking, insurance 
and investment business activities and risk profiles are significantly different may encourage financial 
conglomerates to engage in cross-sectoral risk transfers to tap the full potential of diversification 
benefits.
33 There may be strong financial incentives for such groups to book certain transactions in 
one group entity rather than in another upon the analysis of the costs and benefits of cross-sectoral 
risk  transfers,  which  can  be  motivated  by  legal  and  tax  considerations  as  well  as  accounting 
conventions. Cross-sectoral risk transfers can, however, also be motivated so as to exploit regulatory 
lacuna resulting from different sectoral capital regimes which is to (unterbinden) be prevented by an 
adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates. 
  Despite the aforementioned benefits, however, it needs to be born in mind that the use of a 
conglomerate  business  structure  also  creates  a  number  of  problems,  in  particular  relating  to 
management autonomy, corporate transparency and conflict of interests. Moreover, conglomeration 
can also exacerbate existing and create new financial and legal risks.
34 
 
III.  Regulation and supervision of financial conglomerates  
  Financial institutions play a major role as intermediaries in the efficient allocation of capital 
and in providing the market with sufficient liquidity, which are vital for a well-functioning economy.
35 
The fundamental need for regulating and supervising such institutions is undisputed, reasoned by the 
necessity to protect consumers and creditors and given the high impact financial institutions can 
have on the stability of the financial system as a whole. They are therefore amongst the most heavily 
                                                 
27   Mälkönen (2004b), p. 7. 
28   Walker (2001), p. 176. 
29   Mälkönen (2004a), p. 34. 
30   FDIC Consumer News Spring 2001, http://www.fdic.gov/CONSUMERS/consumer/news/cnspr01/cvrstry.html. 
31   Warth (2003), p. 410. 
32   Dierick (2004), p. 4. 
33   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 6. 
34   Walker (2001), p. 176. 
35   Kremers/Schoenmaker/Wierts (2003), p. 228.  
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regulated and tightly supervised entities.
36 The concerns about systemic risks and financial stability 
are highest in respect of the banking sector due to its strong linkage with the macro-economy.
37 As 
the banking sector is particularly sensitive to fluctuations in confidence of market participants, a lax 
supervision would inter alia increase the risk of a bank run and thereby facilitate the outbreak of 
financial  crises.
38 An  effective  regulation  and  supervision  of  insurance  undertakings  as  well  as 
investment firms is also essential as these institutions channel household savings into the financial 
markets and the real economy.
39 
  Financial regulation and supervision has traditionally developed separately for each financial 
sector, the banking, insurance and investment services sectors. Historically, financial conglomerates 
have  been  supervised  solely  along  single  business  lines.
40 The  idea  of  subjecting  financial 
conglomerates to a special prudential regime had been criticised in the past when the mainstream 
economic policy was dominated by the idea of deregulation and minimisation of regulatory burden in 
order to enhance competition and to support national economic goals.
41 In recent years, however, a 
widespread  consensus  among  practitioners  and  academics  has  developed  that  an  effective 
supervision of financial conglomerates requires a group-wide perspective in addition to the sectoral 
supervision of single businesss lines, notwithstanding the fundamental importance of the latter.
42 In 
particular, such comprehensive view is considered vital in respect of an adequate level of capital as it 
allows supervisors to make a realistic assessment of a group’s overall risks and its capital coverage.
43 
In addition, it is considered essential to devise consistent rules across different sectors while leaving 
no  gaps  for  regulatory  arbitrage  and  to  foster  an  effective  exchange  of  information  and  close 
cooperation between financial supervisors across sectors as well as across borders.
44  
  In  2000,  the  European  Commission  observed  that  the  lack  of  a  prudential  framework 
applicable  to  financial  conglomerates  as  a  group  hampered  an  effective  supervision  over  such 
groups; while certain types of financial groups were not captured by existing legislation (underlaps), 
inconsistencies occurred in the treatment of similar prudential questions by sectoral legislation and 
the same financial group could be subject to multiple directives (overlaps).
45 Against this backdrop, 
the  FCD  was  adopted  in  2002,  introducing  a  supplementary  group-wide  supervision  of  financial 
conglomerates.  Prior  to  the  FCD,  financial  group  supervision only  existed  vis-à-vis  homogeneous 
financial  groups.  The  transposition  of  the  FCD  provisions  into  national  law  in  the  EU  presents 
worldwide  the  first  comprehensive  implementation  of  a  supplementary  supervisory  framework 
applicable to financial conglomerates.
46 It has to a large extent been inspired by the work of the 
Tripartite  Group  of  Bank,  Securities  and  Insurance  Regulators  (Tripartite  Group)
47 and  the  Joint 
                                                 
36   Mishkin/Eakins (2009), p. 395. 
37   Joint Forum (2001b), para. 38.  
38   Domestic banking crises can easily produce international spill-over-effects due to the ever increasing interlinkages 
between national financial systems while the interconnectedness of sectoral businesses and the blurred sectoral 
boundaries in the financial industry can intensify cross-sectoral spill-over effects. 
39   European Commission (2007), explanatory memorandum, p. 2. 
40   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 46. 
41   Cf. Filipova (2006), pp. 27-28, footnotes 17-18 for further references. 
42   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 42; European Commission (2000), pp. 8-10; Walker (2001), p. 217; Jackson (2005), 
p. 124. 
43   Tripartite Group (1995), paras. 43-44; Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001), p. 12. 
44   Schilder (2007); Crockett (2001), Part III. 
45   European Commission (2000), p. 9. 
46   European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/index_en.htm. 
47   The formation of the Tripartite Group in 1993 was driven by concerns about the growth of financial conglomerates. 
The Tripartite Group consisted of banking, insurance and securities regulators who met to identify the regulatory and 
supervisory challenges in respect of the rapid growth of financial conglomerates. In 1996, the Group was superseded 
by the Joint Forum.  
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Forum
48 and  is  based  on  internationally  agreed  recommendations  on  supervision  of  financial 
conglomerates.  
In  substance,  the  FCD  provides  for  additional  capital  requirements  for  financial 
conglomerates  and  prescribes  group-wide  risk  management  processes  and  internal  control 
mechanisms.  It  further  subjects  intra-group  transactions  and  risk  concentrations  of  financial 
conglomerates to supplementary supervision and promotes a closer coordination and cooperation 
between national authorities. 
  Procedurally, the FCD was “born” in the context of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), 
which  has  been  developed  in  order  to  establish  a  competitive  and  integrated  financial  services 
market  in  the  EU.
49 The  FCD  follows  the  Lamfalussy  procedure
50,  which  constitutes  a  legislative 
technique adopted for legislations relating to financial markets, and sets the framework principles for 
the supervision of financial conglomerates (so-called “level 1” of the Lamfalussy procedure). The 
implementing  technical  measures  in  regard  to  the  FCD  need  to  be  adopted  by  the  European 
Commission  after  consultation  with  national  representatives  in  the  European  Financial 
Conglomerates Committee (EFCC) (so-called “level 2” of the Lamfalussy procedure). 
  To present, the European Commission has called for technical advice from the JCFC (the 
former IWCFC) on three occasions. The first call for technical advice
51 dates back to 12 June 2007 and 
deals  with  the capital  adequacy of  financial conglomerates.  The  JCFC  produced  three  reports  in 
response to this call, which will be discussed in greater detail below in Part 2, III, 3 of this paper. The 
second call for technical advice of 12 June 2007 concerns the extent to which the conglomerate 
supervision arrangements of the Swiss and the US financial authorities are likely to achieve the 
objectives of the  FCD.
52 The  third call  for  advice  was  transmitted  to  the  JCFC  in  April 2008  and 
concerns the effectiveness of the FCD in the light of its objectives, the Member States’ practices of 
the FCD and the compatibility of the FCD with the underlying sectoral rules.
53 In response, the JCFC 
published  its  final  advice  on  30  October  2009.
54 On  the  basis  of  this  last  advice,  the  European 
Commission plans to propose legislative amendments to the FCD which are expected in the course of 
this year. 
 
PART 2: CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES IN THE EU 
  Capital adequacy regulation of financial institutions, to wit having a framework in place on 
how  financial  institutions  must  manage  their  own  funds,  has  traditionally  been  the  most 
fundamental form of regulating financial activities.
55 It is the main tool for financial authorities to 
ensure the soundness and safety of financial institutions and to safeguard the viability of the financial 
system.
56  
                                                 
48   The Joint Forum was established in 1996 under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and is comprised of an equal number of senior bank, insurance and securities supervisors 
representing each supervisory constituency. It was initially referred to as “The Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates” but its name was shortened to “The Joint Forum” in 1999 when its new mandate was extended to 
issues of common interest to all three sectors beyond financial conglomerates. 
49   European Commission (1999), p. 21. 
50   See “Final report of the committee of wise men on regulation of European securities markets” (also referred to as 
“The Lamfalussy Report”), published on February 15, 2001. 
51   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/20070612_iwcfc-sectoral_en.pdf. 
52   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/20070612_iwcfc-supervision_en.pdf. 
53   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/200804-cfa_en.pdf; 
  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/iwc_add_advice_en.pdf. 
54   http://www.c-ebs.org/documents/Publications/Advice/2009/FCD-advice/JCFC-advice-on-FCD-Review-FINAL.aspx. 
55   Scott (2008), para. 7-001. 
56   Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), p. 40; Crouhy/Galai/Mark (2006), p. 71.  
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  As prudential oversight has traditionally developed on a sectoral basis, each financial sector 
provides  for  its  own  set  of  capital  requirements.  Each  regulated  entity  within  a  financial 
conglomerate is thus first and foremost subject to its own sectoral capital requirements on a stand-
alone basis. However, such sectoral approach fails to capture the risks which may accrue or intensify 
at the group level of a financial conglomerate. It is therefore necessary to specially regulate the 
capital of financial conglomerates in a way that all relevant risks will be covered and losses can be 
absorbed at both the individual and the group level.  
  This part briefly elaborates on the role of regulatory capital (I) before outlining the minimum 
capital requirements of the banking and the insurance sectors at the EU level (II). Further, it depicts 
the main reasons as to why a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates is required, 
followed by an adequacy test of the FCD’s capital rules (III). Finally, a conclusion and an outlook on 
remaining  issues  in  respect of  an  adequate capital  regulation  of  financial  conglomerates  will  be 
presented (IV).  
 
I.  Role of regulatory capital 
  Unlike  non-financial  firms,  financial  institutions  are  required  to  hold  a  certain  minimum 
amount  of  capital  by  law,  which  is  designated  as  regulatory  capital.  While  banks,  insurance 
undertakings and investment firms are each subject to very different regulatory capital requirements, 
the fundamental objective and function of capital adequacy regulation remain identical for all sectors. 
Capital regulation primarily aims at achieving an adequate protection of creditors by ensuring the 
continuity and the solvency of financial institutions.
57 The financial solidity of institutions in turn can 
promote financial stability and fair and stable markets.  
  Regulatory capital provides a buffer against losses, which are not covered by a sufficient 
volume of profits and serves as a safety net for a variety of risks related to the business.
58 At the 
same time, it serves as an important yardstick for supervisors and the market to assess the financial 
and prudential safety and soundness of a financial institution.
59 An adequate level of capital buffer is 
important to creditors as it can reduce the risk that a financial institution will fail upon an unexpected 
loss. Moreover, it is also important to society where the firm is a bank because the failure of banks 
can result in the loss of economically valuable relationships, investments or knowledge.
60 It is also 
argued that a principle role of regulatory capital is to contain risk taking.
 61 The level of regulatory 
capital is determined by the risk positions of each institution.
62 Key components for maximising the 
effectiveness of capital adequacy regulation have been identified to be a risk-sensitive regulatory 
framework and enhanced risk management of financial institutions.
63 
  Regulatory capital is to be distinguished from the notion of economic capital. The concept of 
economic capital is generally used internally by the institutions and refers to the funds that individual 
financial  institutions  consider  necessary  for  managing  their  business  operations  in  the  light  of 
                                                 
57   Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC), p. 202, recital 12; Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC), p. 3, 
recitals 16 and 17; see also Section 10 (1) of the German Banking Act: “in order to meet their obligations to their 
creditors, and particularly in order to safeguard the assets entrusted to them, institutions must have adequate own 
funds”. 
58   Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC), p. 202, recital 12; Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC), p. 7, 
recital 62.  
59   Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC), p. 202, recital 12.  
60   Tarullo (2008), p. 16.  
61   See Tarullo (2008), pp. 16 and 17 for a discussion and further references with regard to this proposition. Some have 
contested this view and claimed that capital requirements may under certain circumstances increase risk taking. 
However, it seems that nowadays regulators and many academics accept that well-conceived capital requirements 
will generally discourage undue risk-taking by regulated entities.  
62   Greuning/Brajovic Bratanovic (2003), p. 102; Doff (2007), p. 6 and p. 20. 
63   European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm.  
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prudent risk management and is shaped by the subjective judgments of the managers.
64 Regulatory 
and economic capital can differ with regard to the measurement and quantification of risks as well as 
in respect of the relationship between the risk measure and the required amount of capital. It is the 
goal of financial authorities to bring regulatory capital into line with economic capital
65, in particular 
as the gap between those two may create undesirable capital arbitrage opportunities.
66 
 
II.  Sectoral capital regulation 
  Against  the  backdrop  of  the  tradition  of  universal  banking,  the  European  legislator  has 
harmonised the capital requirements for banks and investment firms, which are laid down in the 
Capital Requirements Directive (‘CRD’). The CRD comprises the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC)
67 and 
the Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC)
 68. The provisions of the CRD have been implemented 
into national law and are applicable in the Member States since 1 January 2007. The harmonisation 
of the capital requirements for banks and investment firms has mainly been driven by the aim of 
ensuring competitive neutrality between non-bank investment firms on the one hand and universal 
banks  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter  being  subject  to  stringent  capital  requirements  with  its 
engagements in banking and investment activities.
69 As the current EU capital regulatory framework 
for banks and investment firms are identical and given the practical importance of the combination 
of banking and insurance businesses in the EU, the following chapter will solely focus on banks and 
insurance undertakings.
70 
 
1.  Banking sector 
  The EU capital regulatory framework for banks is laid down in the CRD. It has undergone 
substantial changes in the past few years as a result of the adoption of the “Basel II International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” (‘Basel II’) by the CRD. Basel II is a 
framework comprising internationally developed comprehensive measures and minimum standards 
for capital adequacy of banks. It was developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS)
71 and released in June 2004. The CRD is sufficiently consistent with Basel II to be considered 
equivalent to it.
72 
Basel II was preceded by the “Basel Capital Accord of 1988” (‘Basel I’), which served as the 
basis for the banking directives in the EU prior to Basel II.
73 Basel I had introduced for the first time 
                                                 
64   Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), p. 40; CEPS Task Force Report (2008), p. 19. 
65   This is a declared objective of “Basel II - International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf?noframes=1. 
66   Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), p. 45; Doff (2007), pp. 19-20. 
67   Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, pp. 1-200. 
68   Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of 
investment firms and credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, pp. 201-255. 
69   In contrast to the EU approach, the USA and Japan apply distinct capital regimes for banks and investment firms. 
70   As the sectoral capital adequacy requirements serve as the foundation on top of which the FCD is based on, this 
chapter appears indispensable and aims at contributing to a better understanding of the supplementary capital 
adequacy requirements of the FCD. However, delving too deeply into the technical details of the sectoral rules would 
go beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, this chapter aims at depicting the main concept and the core rules of 
the sectoral capital regimes and at highlighting the main sectoral commonalities and differences. 
71   The BCBS was established as a standing committee of the central bank governors of the G-10 countries in 1974. Today, 
the committee includes 27 different countries that are represented by their central bank and financial authorities in 
charge of prudential supervision of banking business. The committee does not possess any formal supranational 
supervisory authority but formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of 
best practice.  
72   Banking Directive (2006/48/EC), p. 4, recital (37). 
73   Basel I served as a basis for the Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit 
institutions (OJ L 386, 30.12.1989, pp. 14-22) and the Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 April 1989 on the own funds 
of credit institutions (OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p. 16-20).  
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minimum  capital  standards  for  internationally  active  banks  with  the  aim  of  strengthening  the 
soundness and stabilty of the international banking system and establishing a level playing field at 
the global level. While Basel I solely focused on setting quantitative minimum capital standards, 
Basel II has introduced a three pillar system for bank capital regulation. The first pillar stipulates 
minium capital requirements covering credit risk, operational risk and market risk and introduces 
improved  techniques  for  risk  measurements.  The  second  pillar  embraces  a  supervisory  review 
process, which encourages supervisors to assess the internal approaches to capital allocation and 
capital adequacy of banks and aims at covering external factors and risks that are not (fully) taken 
into account under the first pillar. The third pillar deals with market discipline and reinforces the first 
two pillars by requiring banks to publish certain information related to their risks, capital and risk 
management. Basel II constitutes a move from purely quantitative minimum capital standards to a 
combined quantitative and qualitative supervisory approach. 
  The European Commission has recently put forward a revision to the CRD with the aim of 
addressing the shortcomings in the current capital regulatory framework, as have been identified 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
74 On 1 October 2008, the European Commission adopted a 
proposal
75 for a directive (‘CRD II Review’) amending the CRD in certain key areas, including capital 
requirements, liquidity risk management, home-host supervisory issues and crisis arrangements, as 
have been prompted by the financial market crisis, but also including amendments in areas which 
had  been  “left  open”  at  the  time  of  the  CRD  adoption  such  as  the  large  exposures  regime, 
derogations for bank networks from prudential requirements and the treatment of hybrid capital 
instruments within original own funds. The proposed amendments have been adopted
76 and need to 
be implemented into national law by 31 October 2010 for application as of 31 December 2010. On 13 
July 2009, the European Commission proposed further amendments to the CRD (‘CRD III (Summer) 
Review’) which addresses the risks linked to two major causes of the recent financial crisis, namely 
securitisation  and  remuneration.
77 This  proposal  contains  amendments  with  regard  to  capital 
requirements for the trading book and re-securitisations, disclosure of securitisation exposures, and 
remuneration. The pertinent legislative procedure is currently still ongoing.
78 Finally, the European 
Commission carried out a public consultation from 24 July 2009 to 4 September 2009 with the aim of 
proposing anew further amendments to the CRD (‘CRD  IV Review’) relating to through-the-cycle 
expected  loss  provisioning,  specific  incremental  capital  requirements  for  residential  mortgages 
denominated  in  a  foreign  currency,  and  the removal  of  national  options  and  discretions.  Hence, 
numerous legislative changes to the CRD are expected in the near future. 
 
1.1.  Business activities and risk exposures 
  As an adequate capital base serves as a buffer against risks resulting from an institution’s 
business  activities,  the  review of  the  capital  adequacy  regime  requires  an  understanding  of  the 
traditional business activities and the underlying risk profiles of the institution. The following stylised 
                                                 
74   See EBC Info-letter, Issue 1 (September 2009) for an overview of the current regulatory developments in the EU, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/ebc/index_en.htm. 
75   European Commission, “Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large 
exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management”, COM (2008) 602 final, 1 October 2008; European 
Commission (2008), Accompanying document to the Proposal, SEC(2008) 2533, p. 2. 
76   Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, 
large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management, OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, pp. 97-119. 
77   European Commission, “Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the 
supervisory review of remuneration policies”, COM/2009/0362 final, 13 July 2009. 
78   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=COD/2009/0099.  
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balance sheet of a bank illustrates the core business activities of banks and the major risks that they 
typically face: 
Stylised balance sheet: Bank 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
ASSET CLASS  %  LIABILITY CLASS  % 
  Cash and cash equivalents  0.8    Inter-bank borrowing (deposits)  10.1 
  Inter-bank lending  12.4    Customer deposits  60.4 
  Securities  8.5    Debt securities  10.9 
  Loans and advances to customers 
Gross loan amounts 
Loan loss reserves 
Loans net of reserves 
 
69.0 
(0.8) 
68.2 
  Other liabilities  4.6 
 
  Prepayments and accrued income  1.9    Accruals and deferred income  2.8 
  Tangible and intangible fixed assets  3.4    Loss reserves for liabilities and charges  1.2 
  Other assets  4.8    Subordinated debt  4.5 
      Total shareholder equity  5.5 
TOTAL ASSETS  100  TOTAL LIABILITIES  100 
Figure 1
79 
  It can be deduced from the above that banks mainly engage in granting loans and extending 
credits. The  majority  of  a  bank’s  assets  consists  of  loans  and  other credit  exposures, which  are 
primarily funded by deposits collected from customers and other banks. The risks resulting from 
those business activities that could seriously threaten a bank’s continued solvency are typically credit 
risk, operational risk and market risk. Furthermore, banks also face funding liquidity risk resulting 
from the structure of the balance sheets, which often contain significant amounts of short-term 
liabilities and relatively illiquid assets.
80 
  Credit risk is the risk that a change in the credit quality of counterparties will affect the value 
of a security or a portfolio.
81 Credit risk has traditionally been the most important category of risk in 
the banking sector as it is inherent to the principle lending activities of banks. Banks also often 
provide off-balance sheet credits or engage in other forms of off-balance sheet lending commitments, 
which may constitute as much as half of their total assets, further underscoring the importance of 
credit risk.
82  
  Operational risk relates to a bank’s overall organisation and functioning of internal systems.
83 
It  refers  to  potential  losses  resulting  from  e.g.  inadequate  (technology-related)  systems,  failed 
compliance  with  bank  policies  and  procedures,  management  failure,  faulty  controls,  fraud  and 
human error.
84 The coverage of operational risk has only been introduced recently in the EU capital 
regulatory framework through the adoption of Basel II.  
  Market risk is the risk that changes in financial market prices and rates will reduce the value 
of  a  security  or  a  portfolio.
85 It  mainly  encompasses  interest  rate  risks  and  currency  risks.  The 
coverage of market risks by regulatory capital was introduced through an amendment of Basel I in 
1996. The current capital framework only covers the market risk in the trading book. 
  Funding liquidity risk is the current or prospective risk arising from an institution’s inability to 
meet its liabilities/obligations as they come due without incurring unacceptable losses.
86 Banks are 
particularly vulnerable to this type of risk as they finance many illiquid long-term assets (mostly loans) 
with short-term liabilities (inter-bank and customer deposits), which are vulnerable to a “run” in case 
of a drop in confidence.
87 Funding liquidity risk can be mitigated by diversifying funding sources, 
                                                 
79   Joint Forum (2001c), Annex 2. 
80   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 11. 
81   Crouhy/Galai/Mark (2006), p. 29. 
82   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 10. 
83   Crouhy/Galai/Mark (2006), p. 30. 
84   Greuning/Brajovic Bratanovic (2003), p. 3. 
85   Crouhy/Galai/Mark (2006), p. 27. 
86   CEBS (2008b), para. 15. 
87   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 19.  
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holding  a  buffer  of  highly  liquid  assets,  and  setting  credit  lines  in  place  and  monitoring  buying 
power
88.
89 Until recently, the CRD had not specified how to adequately manage liquidity risk. As the 
recent financial market turmoil has particularly highlighted the importance of liquidity risk as a key 
determinant  of  the  soundness  of  the  banking  system,  the  European  legislator  has  adopted  an 
amendment to the CRD on 6 May 2009 (CRD II Review) providing an appropriate level of liquidity 
buffer and a proper incentive for banks to better understand their liquidity risk profile.
90 The newly 
introduced provisions largely build on the work conducted by the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) and the BCBS to develop sound principles for liquidity risk management.
91 
 
1.2.  Sectoral capital requirements 
  Under the current EU capital regulatory framework, banks must quantify their credit risk, 
operational risk and market risk and back them with adequate capital. The CRD has adopted a more 
modern  and  precise  measurement  of  risks  in  comparison  to  the  formerly  applicable  risk-weight 
system based on Basel I. Basel I defined regulatory capital in two tiers, core capital (tier 1) and 
supplementary capital (tier 2), and was mainly geared towards assessing capital in relation to credit 
risk.
92 It required the risk-weighting of assets and set the target ratio of capital to weighted risk 
assets at 8 %, of which the core capital needed to be at least 4 %.
93 The risk-weighted assets of a 
bank used to be computed by multiplying the outstanding credits of the concerned bank by five 
defined risk weights – 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 %.
94 The risk weights used to be fixed and assigned on 
the basis of the classification of borrowers, irrespective of the individual borrower’s actual default 
risk.
95 This  simplified  approach  to  risk-weighting  had  the  drawback  of  not  being  sufficiently  risk 
sensitive as the standardised degrees of credit risk exposure did not adequately account for the 
borrowers’ actual default risks.
96 Moreover, assigning the same risk weight to all risks of a certain 
category of credit
97 could lead to a major distortion when such credits covered a wide range of risks, 
as reflected in credit ratings of public companies.
98 
  In response to the shortcomings of Basel I, the CRD (based on Basel II) focuses on aligning the 
capital requirements more closely to the underlying risks. The minimum solvency ratio of 8 % has 
remained unchanged and is calculated as follows: 
 
Figure 2
99 
  According  to  the  nature  of  items  constituting  regulatory  capital,  the  CRD  distinguishes 
between original own funds on the one hand and additional own funds on the other. In addition, 
                                                 
88   Buying power refers to the amount that a trading counterparty can borrow against assets under stressed market 
conditions.  
89   Crouhy/Galai/Mark (2006), p. 30; Joint Forum (2001c), p. 19. 
90   See amended legislative text of Annex V and XI of the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC); European Commission (2008), 
pp. 37-38. 
91   CEBS (2008b) and BCBS (2008). 
92   Basel I (1988), paras. 14 and 31. In 1996, Basel I was amended so as to account for market risk.  
93   Basel I (1988), para. 44.  
94   Basel I (1988), para. 29.  
95   The detailed weighting structure is set out in Annexes 2 and 3 of Basel I (1988). For instance, claims on OECD central 
governments were attributed a risk weight of 0 % and claims on OECD incorporated banks a risk weight of 20 %. 
96   CEPS Task Force Report (2008), p. 18. 
97   For instance, all private credits used to be risk-weighted at 100 %. 
98   Scott (2008), para. 7-013. 
99   www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule1.en.php.  
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banks can use ancillary own funds to cover market risk. Original own funds (tier 1
100) are of the 
highest quality and permanence and mainly comprise paid-up capital, reserves and funds for general 
banking risks.
101 These funds represent the strongest elements of regulatory capital, providing the 
highest capacity to absorb losses without any limits to their use for regulatory purposes, and are the 
basis on which most market judgments of capital adequacy are made. In order to qualify for this form 
of capital, funds must be (i) issued and fully paid-in, (ii) permanent, (iii) available to fully absorb 
losses on a going-concern basis and under stress and (iv) provide the institution with full discretion as 
to the amount and timing of distributions.
102 Additional own funds (tier 2) are of lower quality and 
less  permanent  nature  than  original  own  funds.  They  include  e.  g.  revaluation  reserves,  value 
adjustments and subordinated term debt.
103 In order to reflect the lower quality of additional own 
funds, Article 66 Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) sets limits for the admissible amount of additional 
own funds in relation to the amount of original own funds. Ancillary own funds (tier 3) constitute the 
lowest level of capital and can solely be used to support market risk. They include for instance net 
profit from trading book positions and subordinated loan capital.
104  
  There are two methods banks can apply to compute the level of their regulatory capital in 
relation to credit risks. First, banks can apply the Standardised Approach
105 which requires them to 
depend on external rating agencies, recognised by supervisors, to award risk scores to outstanding 
claims. Claims can generally be given a risk-weight of 0 %, 20 %, 50 %, 100 % or 150 % contingent 
upon their external ratings.
106 Secondly, banks can apply the Internal Rating-Based (IRB) Approach
107, 
which allows them to depend on their own risk measurement. There are two variations of the IRB 
Approach, the Basic IRB Approach and the Advanced IRB Approach. The IRB Approach comprises four 
risk  parameters  for  the  calculation  of  regulatory  capital  which  is  determined  as  the  product  of 
“exposure at  default” (EAD)  and  the  result  of  the risk-weight  function  involving  the  parameters 
“probability of default” (PD), “loss given default” (LGD) and “effective maturity” (M). In using the 
Basic IRB Approach, banks only need to estimate the PD of their borrowers internally while the LGD, 
EAD and M are determined by the competent supervisors and depend on the type of product and the 
collateral posted. Under the Advanced IRB Approach, banks can use their own internal assessment 
for all four risk parameters. 
  As regards group supervision, the CRD applies consolidated supervision to banking groups
108 
that are headed by a credit institution (parent credit institution in a Member State or EU parent credit 
institution)
109, which has a credit institution or a financial institution
110 as a subsidiary
111 or holds a 
participation
112 in such an institution and which is not a subsidiary of another credit institution or of a 
                                                 
100   Market participants generally refer to tiers of regulatory capital. The tier terminology is used in connection with the 
Basel capital framework and slightly differs from the terminology used in the CRD. See Annex 1 of CEBS (2006) for a 
corresponding table for the different terminologies of Basel II and the CRD. 
101   Article 57(a) to (ca) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
102   CEBS (2006), p. 10, para. 7; Article 61 Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
103   Article 57 (d) to (h) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
104   Article 13(2) Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC). 
105   Articles 78 to 83 Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
106   Unrated claims are given a risk weight of 100 % with an exception for banks where unrated claims are given a risk 
weight of 50 %. 
107   Articles 84 to 89 Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
108   Consolidated supervision also applies to groups that include investment firms. 
109   See Article 4(14) and (16) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) for definition.  
110   Financial institution in this case refers to an undertaking other than a credit institution, the principal activity of which 
is to acquire holdings or to carry on one or more of the activities listed in numbers 2-12 of Annex I of the Banking 
Directive, see Article 4 (5) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
111   See Article 4(13) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) for definition.  
112   Participations are (i) rights in the capital of other undertakings which by creating a “durable link” with those 
undertakings are intended to contribute to the company’s activities or (ii) the ownership, direct or indirect, of 20  
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financial holding company.
113 In addition, subject to a consolidated supervision are groups that are 
headed by a financial holding company (parent financial holding company in a Member State or EU 
parent  financial  holding  company)
114 whose  subsidiaries  are  either  exclusively  or  mainly  credit 
institutions or financial institutions while at least one subsidiary must be a credit institution.
115 Only 
credit institutions that are part of a group are subject to supervision on a consolidated basis. Non-
credit institutions are neither subject to consolidated supervision nor subject to supervision on a 
stand-alone  basis  but  they  may  be  required  to  supply  information  that  is  relevant  for  the 
consolidated  supervision.
116 Consolidated  group  supervision  is  carried  out  on  the  basis  of 
consolidated accounts of group members with regard to the calculation of own funds but also applies 
in areas relating to e.g. lending limits, restrictions on investments by credit institutions in the non-
bank sector.
117 
 
2.  Insurance sector 
  The EU regulatory capital requirements for insurance undertakings, more commonly referred 
to as solvency margin requirements, were introduced in the 1970s through the adoption of the First 
Non-Life Directive (73/239/EEC)
118 and the First Life Directive (79/267/EEC)
119. The current solvency 
margin requirements are laid down in the First Non-Life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended by the 
Second Non-Life Directive (88/357/EEC)
120 and the Third Non-Life Directive (92/49/EEC)
121, and the 
Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC)
122, which is the consolidated act of three former life insurance 
directives
123. In addition, the Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC)
124 applies to insurance groups. 
  The EU solvency margin requirements were subject to a limited overhaul in 2002, which is 
known as the Solvency I review.
125 During the Solvency I review work, it became apparent that the 
solvency regime for insurance undertakings required a more fundamental and wider ranging review. 
The  regime  in  place  was  considered  to  be  outdated  as  it  was  insufficiently  risk-sensitive  and 
superseded by changes in the industry and by international and cross-sectoral developments. It was 
also  criticised  for  not  dealing  properly  with  group  supervision  and  leaving  too  much  leeway  to 
Member States for national variations.
126 Many Member States had implemented their own reforms 
in the insurance sector in the meantime, which had led to a patchwork of regulatory requirements 
                                                                                                                                                          
percent or more of the voting rights or capital of another undertaking, see Article 4(10) Banking Directive 
(2006/48/EC). 
113   Article 125(1) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
114   See Article 4(15) and (17) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) for definition. 
115   Article 125(2) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
116   Article 127(3) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). 
117   Gruson (2004), p. 4. 
118   First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance, OJ L 228, 
16.08.1973, pp. 3-19. 
119   First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance, OJ L 63, 13.03.1979, pp. 1-18. 
120   Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective 
exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 73/239/EEC, OJ L 172, 04.07.1988, pp. 1-14. 
121   Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (third 
non-life insurance Directive), OJ L 228, 11.08.1992, pp. 1-23. 
122   Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, 
OJ L 345, 19.12.2002, pp. 1-51. 
123   The First Life Directive (79/267/EEC), the Second Life Directive (90/619/EEC), and the Third Life Directive (92/96/EEC). 
124   Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the supplementary 
supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group, OJ L 330, 05.12.1998, pp. 1–12. 
125   The solvency provisions in the Recast Life Directive and the First Non-life Directive were amended by two directives in 
2002, Directive 2002/13/EC and Directive 2002/12/EC. 
126   European Commission (2007), Explanatory memorandum, p. 2.  
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across the EU. The European legislator therefore initiated a major overhaul of the insurance solvency 
framework  with  the  aim  of  introducing  a  harmonised  regime  which  would  better  reflect  the 
developments in prudential standards, actuarial science and risk management.
127 This major overhaul 
is referred to as the Solvency II review and envisages a more sophisticated economic risk-based 
approach to solvency margin requirements. It is based on a three pillar structure similar to the 
Basel II framework. The first pillar consists of quantitative solvency margin requirements, the second 
pillar sets out requirements for the governance and risk management of insurance undertakings 
while the third pillar focuses on disclosure and transparency requirements. The Solvency II review 
resulted in the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC)
128. The provisions of the Solvency II 
Directive  (2009/138/EC)  must  be  implemented  into  national  law  by  31 October  2010  and  will 
supplant inter alia the First Non-Life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended, the Recast Life Directive 
(2002/83/EC) and the Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC) with effect from 1 November 2010.  
 
2.1.  Business activities and risk exposures 
  The insurance sector is dominated by two types of insurance, namely life insurance and non-
life  insurance.  Insurance  undertakings  collect  capital  through  underwriting,  a  process  by  which 
insurers first select the risks they wish to insure, measure the risks and exposures of potential clients 
and determine the premiums to be charged for those risks. Subsequently, they sell the insurances 
and collect the premiums in return which are invested in a broad range of assets. The core business 
of  insurance  undertakings  consists  of  risk  bearing. The  following  stylised  balance  sheet  gives  an 
overview of the business operations of a life insurance undertaking:  
Stylised balance sheet: Life insurance undertaking 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
ASSET CLASS  %  LIABILITY CLASS  % 
Subscribed capital unpaid  0.1  Capital and Reserves  1.2 
Investments: 
-  Real estate 
-  Investments in affiliates/participating interests 
-  Variable yield securities (equity) 
-  Bearer and other fixed income securities 
-  Loans guaranteed by mortgages/land charges 
-   Listed bonds 
-  Debentures and loans 
-  Others and deposits with banks/ceding undertakings 
93.3 
2.8 
3.9 
22.0 
7.1 
11.1 
27.9 
15.5 
3.0 
Special items with an equity portion  0.2 
Deposits for life assurance policies/ investment risk born 
by policyholders 
1.9  Technical provisions (net): 
-  Mathematical provision 
-  Provisions for bonuses/rebates 
-  Unearned premiums/claims outstanding 
83.1 
72.4 
9.1 
1.6 
Debtors  1.2  Technical provisions for life assurance 
policies/investment risk born by policyholders 
1.8 
Accruals  1.7  Deposits retained on re-insurance ceded  4.5 
Other assets  1.8  Other liabilities  9.2 
TOTAL ASSETS  100  TOTAL LIABILITIES  100 
Figure 3
129 
  While over 90 % of the assets are kept in a portfolio with a wide range of investment assets, 
about 80 % of the liabilities are technical provisions. Technical provisions are the amounts estimated 
to  be  appropriate  to  meet  potential  future  claims  arising  out  of  insurance  contracts  and  are 
calculated according to prudent actuarial and statistical principles.
130 It is striking that capital and 
reserves only make up 1.2 % of the liabilities. These figures explain how an insurance undertaking 
typically operates. Premiums collected from policy holders are invested in a variety of assets over 
long periods that can generate returns. At the same time, the firm calculates the potential future 
                                                 
127   European Commission (2007). 
128   Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and 
pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, pp. 1–155. 
129   Joint Forum (2001c), Annex 2, p. 82.  
130   Joint Forum (2001c), Annex 3, p. 85.  
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claims  of  policy  holders  according  to  an  actuarial  and  statistical  basis  and  sets  aside  technical 
provisions to cover anticipated claims and costs arising from the policies it has written. 
  Non-life insurance undertakings operate similiarly to life insurance undertakings. However, 
there is a difference which can be examined on the basis of the following balance sheet. 
Stylised balance sheet: Non-life insurance undertaking 
Assets  Liabilities 
Asset Class  %  Liability Class  % 
Subscribed capital unpaid  0.8  Capital and Reserves: 
  Subscribed capital 
  Capital reserves 
  Revenue reserves 
  -   Profit 
19.9 
4.0 
4.3 
10.5 
1.1 
Intangible assets  0.4  Participating certificates/subordinated liabilities  0.5 
Investments: 
-   Real estate 
-  Investments in affiliates/participating interests 
-  Variable yield securities 
-  Bearer and other fixed income securities 
-  Loans guaranteed by mortgages/land charges 
-   Listed bonds 
-  Debentures and loans 
-  Others and deposits with banks/ceding institutions 
86.3 
4.2 
11.8 
23.9 
11.9 
1.7 
17.3 
11.5 
4.0 
Special items with an equity portion  0.7 
Debtors  1.4  Technical provisions (net): 
-  Unearned premiums/mathematical provision 
-  Claims outstanding 
-  Provisions for bonuses/rebates 
-  Equalisation provision etc./others 
61.5 
10.0 
41.2 
0.9 
9.4 
Accruals  1.4  Deposits retained on re-insurance ceded  2.3 
Other assets  7.7  Other liabilities  15.1 
Total Assets  100  Total Liabilities  100 
Figure 4
131 
  In contrast to life insurance undertakings, non-life insurance undertakings typically hold a 
lower amount of technical provisions and in lieu thereof a higher amount of capital and reserves. In 
the  current  example,  technical  provisions  represent  approximately  60 %  whereas  capital  and 
reserves amount up to 20 % of the liabilities. The much larger share of capital can be explained by 
the greater uncertainty associated with non-life insurance claims relative to life insurance claims. Life 
insurance claims can be estimated with a reasonable amount of statistical assurance while potential 
claims  for  non-life  insurance  policies  are  less  predictable.  Hence,  there  is  a  higher  need  for  an 
additional buffer over the technical provisions in the non-life insurance industry which results in a 
higher amount of capital serving as a buffer for losses.
132  
  Deducing from the above, the most relevant risk for insurance undertakings is technical risk 
(also referred to as insurance underwriting risk), i.e. the risk that the collected premiums will not be 
sufficient to actually cover all future claims and costs arising from policies that have been written.
133 
Apart from technical risk, insurance undertakings also face investment risk and other non-technical 
risks. Investment risk relates to the potential loss in the value of investments made by an insurance 
undertaking and includes credit, market and liquidity risk.
134 Non-technical risks include operational 
risk.
135  
 
2.2.  Sectoral capital requirements 
  Technical  provisions  constitute  the  main  liabilities  of  insurers  and  are  calculated  on  an 
actuarial and statistical basis. Nonetheless, as sophisticated as calculation methods may be they 
cannot offer an absolute guarantee that the computed and held technical provisions will be sufficient 
                                                 
131   Joint Forum (2001c), Annex 2, p. 83. 
132   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 13. 
133   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 12. 
134   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 12. 
135   Joint Forum (2001c), p. 12.  
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to  meet  all  future  obligations  towards  policy  holders  and  creditors.  Therefore,  an  insurance 
undertaking whose head office is situated in a Member State is required to hold an adequate level of 
capital in respect of its entire business at all times, which can serve as a buffer for unexpected losses 
and  costs  (solvency  margin).
136 Under  the  current  EU  solvency  regime,  the  solvency  margin 
requirements for life insurance undertakings must be equal to the sum of two results, namely (i) 4 % 
of the technical provisions of the insurance undertaking and (ii) 0.3 % of the capital at risk
137 which is 
an amount equal to the difference between the maximum payments under the policies underwritten 
and the technical provisions.
138 The minimum solvency margin to be retained by non-life insurance 
undertakings must be the higher of two results, (i) 16 % of the annual premiums written by the 
concerned institution (18 % up to a certain premium volume) or (ii) 23 % of the average annual 
claims costs incurred by the concerned institution (26 % up to a certain claim volume).
139  
  In respect of the constituents of solvency margin, the current insurance directives distinguish 
between “elements eligible without limits” (e.g. paid-up share capital, reserves, profit and loss)
140, 
“elements  eligible  with  limits”  (e.g.  cumulative  preferential  share  capital,  subordinated  loan 
capital)
141 and “elements eligible subject to prior supervisory approval” (essentially unpaid items)
142. 
In contrast to the banking directives, which employ the terms “original own funds” and “additional 
own funds” to qualify the different layers of eligible capital, the current insurance directives do not 
use any specific terminology in this respect. Despite the distinct terminologies, however, the capital 
elements that are qualified as “elements eligible without limits” and “elements eligible with limits” in 
the  insurance  sector  closely  equate  to  those  which  are  covered  by  “original  own  funds”  and 
“additional own funds” in the banking sector.
143  
As of 1 November 2010, the current solvency margin requirements will be replaced by the 
provisions of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC). Whereas the current regime mainly focuses on 
the liability side (technical risk), the newly adopted Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) takes account 
of the asset-side risks and will require that insurance undertakings also hold capital against market, 
credit and operational risk.
144 The new Solvency II regime will hence introduce a “total balance sheet” 
approach where all the risks and their interactions are considered for measuring solvency.
145 Under 
the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), insurance undertakings will have to hold sufficient capital to 
cover two requirements, namely the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum Capital 
Requirement (MCR). The SCR covers all risks that an insurer faces (i.e. technical, credit, operational 
and market risk) and is based on a Value-at-Risk
146 measure calibrated to a 99.5 % confidence level 
over a 1-year time horizon, i.e. it ensures that the probability of an insurance undertaking being 
ruined during the year is no more than 0.5 %.
147 As soon as the SCR is breached, supervisors are 
required to intervene and take measures to restore the financial position of the concerned insurance 
undertaking.
148 The MCR ensures a minimum level of security below which the amount of financial 
resources should not fall. It should be calculated in a clear and simple manner, including a linear 
                                                 
136   European Commission (1997), p. 3. 
137   Defined under Article 1.1(q) Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC). 
138   Article 28 Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC). 
139   Article 16a First Non-Life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended. 
140   Article 27(2) Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC), Article 16(2) First Non-life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended. 
141   Article 27(3) Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC), Article 16(3) First Non-life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended. 
142   Article 27(2) Recast Life Directive (2002/83/EC), Article 16(2) First Non-life Directive (73/239/EEC), as amended. 
143   JCFC (2007a), para. 26. 
144   Article 101(4)(d)-(f) Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
145   European Commission (2009), p. 1. 
146   A measure used to assess the risk associated with a portfolio of assets and liabilities. It measures the worst expected 
loss under normal conditions over a specific time interval at a given confidence level.  
147   Article 101 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
148   Article 136 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC).  
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function calibrated to the Value-at-Risk of the basic own funds subject to a confidence level of 85 % 
over a 1-year period and different absolute floors for different types of insurances.
149  
  The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) will also introduce specific terminologies in respect 
of eligible capital elements in the insurance sector. It distinguishes between “basic own funds”
150, 
which include (i) excess of assets over liabilities and (ii) subordinated liabilities, and “ancillary own 
funds”
151, which include (i) unpaid share capital or initial fund that has not been called up, (ii) letters 
of credit and guarantees and (iii) any other legally binding commitments received by insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings. It further categorises own funds as tier 1, 2 and 3.
152 The classification as 
tiers depends on the distinction between “basic own funds” and “ancillary own funds” and further 
relies on characteristics such as permanent availability and subordination. 
  Unlike  banking  groups,  insurance  groups  are  currently  not  subject  to  consolidated 
supervision  but  to  a  mere  supplementary  supervision  under  the  Insurance  Group  Directive 
(98/78/EC). The Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC) provides for supplementary supervision of EU-
authorised life or non-life insurance undertakings
153 with at least one subsidiary
154, which must be an 
EU-authorised life, non-life insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking
155 or a non-EU insurance 
undertaking
156. Or it must hold participations
157 in any such entity or must be linked by a horizontal 
structure with any such entity.
158 The current insurance group supervision regime has been criticised 
for the lack of a group supervisor, a clear definition of rights and duties of the supervisors and clear 
guidance  on  how cooperation  between  supervisors (e.g.  exchange  of  information,  consultations, 
verification  of  information)  should  be  organised.
159 The  European  legislator  has  tackled  these 
weaknesses by modernising and simplifying the requirements and by introducing a dedicated “group 
supervisor”
160 with  powers  and  responsibilities  to  organise  the  group  supervision;  the  group 
supervisor will set the SCR for the group, validate any group internal model and act as the central 
point for an effective supervision of the group.
161 
 
3.  Sectoral commonalities and differences 
  The main business activities and risk exposures of banks and insurance undertakings are 
substantially disparate and managed differently as presented above. While banks mainly engage in 
                                                 
149   Article 127 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
150   Article 87 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
151   Article 88 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
152   Articles 93 et seq. Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
153   Insurance undertaking means an undertaking which has received official authorisation in accordance with Article 6 
Directive 73/239/EEC or Article 6 Directive 79/267/EEC (Article 1(a) Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC)). 
154   Subsidiary undertaking means a subsidiary undertaking within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC and 
any undertaking over which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, a parent undertaking effectively exercises a 
dominant influence. All subsidiaries of subsidiary undertakings shall also be considered subsidiaries of the parent 
undertaking which is at the head of those undertakings (Article 1(e) Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC)). 
155   Reinsurance undertaking means an undertaking, other than an insurance undertaking or a non-member-country 
insurance undertaking, the main business of which consists in accepting risks ceded by an insurance undertaking, a 
non-member-country insurance undertaking or other reinsurance undertakings (Article 1(c) Insurance Group 
Directive(98/78/EC)). 
156   Non-member-country insurance undertaking means an undertaking which would require authorisation in accordance 
with Article 6 of Directive 73/239/EEC or Article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC if it had its registered office in the 
Community (Article 1(b) Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC)). 
157   Participation means participation within the meaning of Article 17, first sentence, of Directive 78/660/EEC (9) or the 
holding, directly or indirectly, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital of an undertaking (Article 1(f) Insurance 
Group Directive (98/78/EC)). 
158   Article 2(1) Insurance Group Directive (98/78/EC). A horizontal structure essentially exists if there is control in the 
absence of an equity investment, due to management on a unified basis or cross-membership of governing boards, 
see Gruson (2004), p. 23. 
159   European Commission (2009), p. 10. 
160   Article 251 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
161   European Commission (2009), p. 10.  
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deposit taking  and  lending,  the main  business  activity  of  insurance  undertakings  consists  in  risk 
taking by collecting capital through underwriting and investing it. Banks predominantly incur credit 
and funding liquidity risks and to a less extent market and operational risks while insurers mainly 
bear risks related to their underwriting business (technical risk) and asset and liability management. 
Banks seem to focus rather on individual risks at first and monitor them with a broader view while 
insurance undertakings apply a reverse approach.  
  The capital requirements for banks and insurance undertakings differ substantially. Most 
strikingly,  capital  requirements  for  banks  are  determined  on  the  basis  of  an  institution’s  risk-
weighted assets while solvency requirements for insurance undertakings are based on criteria that 
are related to an insurer’s overall business volume as a risk proxy. To a great extent, the regulatory 
differences can be attributed to the disparate nature and characteristics of the sectoral business 
activities and risks as well as the different ways in which risk is managed and assessed by the firms.
162 
Nonetheless, the banking and the insurance sectors share some commonalities in respect of capital 
regulation. Regulatory capital is intended to fulfil the same fundamental objective in both sectors, 
namely to absorb unexpected losses incurred by the risks of operations on a going concern basis and 
in  a  winding  up  situation.
163 Both  sectoral  capital  regimes  partially  deal  with  identical  risks  (e.g. 
market and operational risks) and provide for similar eligibility criteria of capital elements. In both 
sectors, permanence, loss absorption and flexibility of payments are regarded as core elements that 
are required for the eligibility of regulatory capital.
164 The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) will 
bring  the  different  capital  requirements  more  into  line  in  the  near  future.  The  new  insurance 
solvency regime will take a total balance sheet approach, considering both the liability and the asset 
sides, and include credit, market and operational risk in the solvency margin requirements. The 
Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) will also introduce a classification of eligible capital elements 
according to tiers similar to the categories of own funds in the banking sector and harmonise group 
supervision.  
  In developing an adequate capital regulatory framework for financial conglomerates, the 
differences derived from the disparate nature of the sectoral businesses and risks and consequently 
the distinct prudential approaches are acknowledged to be necessary.
165 In contrast, the differences 
which are not rooted in the sectoral differences are of concern to financial authorities because they 
provide  regulatory  arbitrage  opportunities  and  can  hamper  an  effective  cross-sectoral  capital 
regulation. As a principle, same risks should be treated same while different risks require different 
treatment. It has been identified in the past that supervisory authorities often face major problems 
with regard to the varying sectoral definitions of capital, varying sectoral approaches to asset and 
liability valuation, differing sectoral risks to which they are exposed and different sectoral ways in 
which risk is managed by the firms and assessed.
166 Hence, it seems important to eliminate cross-
sectoral  regulatory  differences  where  appropriate  and  to  strive  for  harmonised  definitions  and 
prudential approaches in relation to capital elements and risks, to the extent possible. In view of the 
currently ongoing legislative changes in the banking sector and the implementation of the Solvency II 
Directive  (2009/138/EC),  the  level  and  adequacy  of  harmonisation  of  both  sectoral  capital 
requirements remain to be examined in the future. 
 
                                                 
162   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 12, para. 6; European Commission (2000), p. 19. 
163   JCFC (2007a), para. 38. 
164   JCFC (2007a), para. 38. 
165   European Commission (2001), p. 5; Scott (2005), p. 4. 
166   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 12, para. 6.  
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III.  Capital regulation of financial conglomerates 
  The  intensification  of  links  between  distinct  sectoral  business  fields  allows  financial 
conglomerates to transfer capital cross-sectorally more easily and use the capital linkage to take 
advantage  of  regulatory  gaps.  In  the  absence  of  a  group-wide  capital  regulation,  financial 
conglomerates  can  use  regulatory  gaps  to  assume  higher  risks  without  providing  an  adequate 
financial base commensurate with the actual risks taken. The weaknesses of a mere sectoral capital 
regulation in respect of financial conglomerates are various, including the risk of multiple use of the 
same capital for regulatory purposes, the failure to address unregulated financial sector entities, the 
inconsistency arising from the different treatment of same risks based on where the transaction is 
booked  and  the  failure  to  take  account  of  risk  concentrations  or  diversification  across  different 
business lines.
167 
 
1.  Weaknesses inherent in sectoral capital regulation  
  The asymmetries between the different sectoral capital regulatory frameworks constitute 
one  of  the  major  weaknesses  with  regard  to  an  adequate  capital  regulation  of  financial 
conglomerates.  They  provide  for  regulatory  arbitrage  opportunities,  which  enable  financial 
conglomerates to capitalise on the misalignment between their actual risks taken and the sectoral 
regulatory requirements that they need to comply with. Regulatory arbitrage effects can be achieved 
through  the  techniques  of  double/multiple  gearing  and  excessive  leveraging,  which  result  in  an 
overstatement of a group’s capital but in an undercapitalisation of the group in reality. In this context, 
the involvement of unregulated entities (e.g. unregulated holding company at the top level) may 
even bolster the effect of these techniques. 
 
1.1.  Double and multiple gearing  
  A  substantially  distorted  effect  in  the  financial  state  of  a  financial  conglomerate  can  be 
achieved by the so-called double and multiple gearing techniques. These techniques allow a financial 
conglomerate to count the same capital simultaneously for two or more regulated entities without 
an actual correspondent increase in the level of regulatory capital.
168 They can therefore give a false 
impression of the overall financial solidity of a group. The following simplified example shows how 
double gearing can impact the calculation of the capital of a financial conglomerate:  
Assume A-Bank is the parent company of B-Insurance with a participation of 100 %. The sectoral 
capital requirement for A-Bank amounts to 1000 while B-Insurance must maintain a capital of at 
least 600 under the sectoral capital regime. The capital linkage and the level of capital of both 
companies are reflected in the following balance sheets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5
169 
  The above balance sheets show that both companies meet their capital requirements on a 
stand-alone basis. The parent company holds a capital of 1200 while it is only required to maintain 
1000. The subsidiary holds a capital of 800 while its regulatory capital amounts to 600. However, the 
                                                 
167   Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001), pp. 6-7.  
168   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 13, para. 18; European Commission (2000), p. 19. 
169   Mione (2006), p. 135. 
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financial  solidity  of  A-Bank  and  B-Insurance  is  compromised  on  a  group-wide  basis.  The  overall 
capital requirement for the group would be 1600 (1000 for the parent company and 600 for the 
subsidiary) while the actually maintained capital only amounts to 1200. This results from the fact that 
the participation of the parent company in the subsidiary represents an asset for the parent on the 
one  hand  while  it  is  reused  as  the  capital  of  the  subsidiary  on  the  other  hand.  An  accurate 
assessment  of  a  financial  conglomerate’s  group-wide  capital  level  needs  to  exclude  intra-group 
holdings of regulatory capital as only capital issued to external (i.e. non-group) investors provides 
support to the group.
170 The financial conglomerate in the above example is undercapitalised as the 
same capital is counted twice for regulatory purposes.  
  The technique of multiple gearing is applied where the same capital is counted multiple 
times to meet the sectoral capital requirements. It can be illustrated on the basis of the above 
example as follows: Assume that B-Insurance on its part has a 100 % participation in an investment 
firm (C-Investment Firm) whose regulatory capital requirement equals 250. B-Insurance invests an 
amount of 300 in C-Investment Firm. In this case, all three entities would meet their respective 
sectoral  capital  requirements  on  a  stand-alone  basis.  However,  the  exemplified  financial 
conglomerate is undercapitalised and fails to meet the aggregated capital requirements at the group-
wide level as the same capital is levered three times.  
  It follows from the above example that the techniques of double and multiple gearing enable 
financial conglomerates to take on additional risks without accordingly increasing their regulatory 
capital charges at the group level. They undermine the function of an adequate capital regulation. 
Regulated single entities within a financial conglomerate may appear financially solid from a sectoral 
perspective while in reality the concerned financial conglomerate as a whole may additionally bear 
substantial but unattended risks.  
 
1.2.  Excessive leveraging 
  Financial  conglomerates  can  further  attempt  to  avoid  burdensome  regulatory  capital 
requirements and reduce their costs through excessive leveraging. Excessive leveraging refers to 
cases  where  a  parent  company  issues  debt  and  downstreams  the  proceeds  as  equity  to  its 
subsidiaries in order to satisfy sectoral capital requirements.
171 Such practice results in an increase in 
prudential risks as the received proceeds are derived from a liability position (debt) of the parent 
company which does not constitute an eligible constituent of regulatory capital. Further, although 
this kind of capital leveraging in itself must not be unsafe or unsound, the parent company could 
place  undue  pressure  on the  recipient  subsidiary  in  times of  financial  stress in  view of  its  own 
obligation to service the concerned debt - for instance by withdrawing capital from the subsidiary or 
by forcing the subsidiary to undetake an uneconomical transaction with related parties.
172 Another 
possible scenario of excessive leveraging is where a parent company issues capital instruments of 
one quality and downstreams them as instruments of a higher quality eligible to serve as regulatory 
capital. Excessive leveraging is another exercise that can lead to an overstatement of regulatory 
capital  as  it  enables  individual  group  entities  to  comply  with  their  respective  sectoral  capital 
requirements while no sufficient capital is provided at the conglomerate level.  
 
1.3.  Unregulated group entities 
  Another problem financial supervisors face in respect of an adequate capital regulation of 
financial  conglomerates  is  where  a  financial  conglomerate  can  demonstrate  sufficient  capital  to 
support its regulated activities but the size and nature of its unregulated activities are such as to 
question  the  overall  capital  adequacy  of  the  group.
173 Unregulated  entities  in  financial  groups 
generally present a problem for financial authorities and make an effective supervision cumbersome 
as they do not fall under the scope of financial supervision. One of the difficulties in carrying out 
supervisory  tasks  in  this  context  lies  in  the  fact  that  supervisory  power  to  access  information 
                                                 
170   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 13, para. 19. 
171   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 14, para. 23; European Commission (2000), p. 19. 
172   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 14, para. 23; Jackson (2005), p. 125. 
173   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 45.  
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regarding unregulated entities is limited.
174 Despite their unregulated status, such entities can still 
have a substantial impact on the stability of the entire group and play an important role. They can 
carry out similar activities to regulated entities and take up relevant risks. Moreover, regulated group 
entities  may  transfer  their  risks  to  unregulated  group  entities  in  order  to  avoid  supervisory 
constraints. A concrete example of the importance of unregulated entities in relation to the capital 
regulation of financial conglomerates can be demonstrated where an unregulated holding company 
at the top of a financial conglomerate creates the effects of excessive leveraging by down streaming 
debts to a regulated subsidiary which in turn are used to meet the subsidiary’s regulatory capital 
requirements.  In  such  a  case,  the  competent  authority  needs  to  ascertain  that  the  unregulated 
holding company is capable of servicing its external debt in order to assess the adequacy of the 
group capital. In general, the competent authority can attempt to obtain information either through 
the regulated entities or make use of public information sources. Such limited access to relevant 
information,  however,  may  often  not  be  sufficient  to  make  an  accurate  and  comprehensive 
assessment of the capital adequacy of the concerned financial conglomerate. As unregulated entities 
have the potential to facilitate the impairment and the circumvention of prudential supervision, they 
principly need to be considered in the capital assessment of financial conglomerates.  
 
1.4.  Other conglomerate risks 
  In addition, there are other risks that can potentially hamper an adequate capital regulation 
of financial conglomerates and may need to be tackled through an adequate group-wide capital 
regulation  of  financial  conglomerates.  A unique  conglomerate  risk  which  may  require  a  higher 
amount of capital at the group level concerns the possibility that a financial conglomerate’s collective 
exposure to a certain risk may be greater than the exposure of each subsidiary firm.
175 It is also 
argued that the usually large size and complexity of financial conglomerates pose greater amounts of 
systemic risk to the economy in general and therefore require higher capital reserves than ordinary 
financial intermediaries with a single line of business.
176 Furthermore, one could possibly think of 
reputational risk which refers to the potential that a negative publicity of one group member in a 
financial conglomerate may affect the whole group. While the merits of these claims can be disputed, 
they underline the importance of a group-wide regulation of capital for financial conglomerates as it 
is only at the group level that certain risks and gaps may be detected and can be properly attended 
to.  
 
2.  Capital requirements under the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
  The  rapid  growth  of  financial  conglomerates  worldwide  induced  financial  supervisors  to 
establish an international working group in 1993, the Tripartite Group, in order to identify and to 
consider ways to address the supervisory challenges financial conglomerates pose. The Tripartite 
Group consisted of banking, insurance and securities supervisors from different countries, acting in a 
personal capacity but drawing on their supervisory experiences. It published a significant report in 
1995,  which  inter  alia  highlighted  the  importance  and  the  necessity  of  a  group-wide  capital 
assessment of financial conglomerates.
177  
  In 1996, the Tripartite Group was superseded by the Joint Forum, which was established to 
take forward the work of the Tripartite Group. The Joint Forum released several reports on the 
supervision  of  financial  conglomerates
178,  in  which  it  emphasised  inter  alia  that  measurement 
techniques for assessing the capital adequacy of financial conglomerates need to be able to detect 
and provide for situations of double/multiple gearing and excessive leveraging, including situations 
where  such  effect  can  be  created  through  unregulated  intermediate  holding  companies.
179 The 
measurement techniques should  be  designed  to  address  the  risks  taken  by unregulated  entities 
                                                 
174   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 84. 
175   Jackson (2005), p. 127. 
176   Jackson (2005), p. 126. 
177   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 6. 
178   See Joint Forum (2001a).  
179   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 11, para. 2.  
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within a financial conglomerate, which carry out activities similar to the activities of regulated group 
entities for solvency purposes.
180 The Joint Forum also stressed the importance of the underlying 
sectoral capital requirements upon which the group-wide capital regulation should be implemented 
as a top-up.
181  
  Considering the necessity of a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates, the 
international working groups had to deal with the question as to how such regulation could be 
implemented in practice. Given that each financial sector generally provides for different definitions 
of regulatory capital and different capital requirements, it was necessary to determine which method 
could best ensure an adequate group-wide capital assessment and eliminate intra-group elements. 
Two principle methodical approaches were put forward in this respect, namely (i) capital regulation 
on a consolidated basis and (ii) a solo-plus approach to capital regulation.
182 Capital regulation on a 
consolidated basis views a financial group as a single economic entity with all intra-group exposures 
netted out and requires that all balance sheets of the group members are consolidated into one 
(accounting consolidation). This approach requires that assets and liabilities of all companies are 
totalled and set against the parent company’s capital. Subsequently, capital requirements are applied 
to the consolidated entity at the parent company level and the result is compared with the parent’s 
capital.
183 It generally assumes that the surplus capital in the individual group entity is available to 
the group as a whole.
184 This is generally a technique applied by banking supervisors in assessing 
capital adequacy of homogeneous banking groups. In comparison, the solo-plus approach focuses on 
individual group entities which are supervised on a stand-alone basis under their sectoral regime. 
The  solo  supervision  is  then  complemented  by  a  quantitative  group-wide  assessment  of  the 
adequacy of capital and a general qualitative assessment.
185  
  The  FCD  provides  for  a  supplementary  group-wide  capital  framework  for  financial 
conglomerates which is applied in addition to the sectoral capital requirements. The supplementary 
capital regulation ensures that the overall capital at the conglomerate level is sufficient to meet the 
total  of  capital  requirements  of  all  entities  within  the  group  after  elimination  of  intra-group 
elements.
186 The group-wide capital assessment is performed by comparing the aggregate of the 
different sectoral requirements with the sum of the group-wide capital. In this respect, the FCD 
partly  provides  for  the  applicability  of  both  the  consolidation  and  the  solo-plus  methods  in 
calculating the group-wide capital. If a financial conglomerate must consolidate its accounts due to 
existing sectoral rules with regard to a homogeneous group structure (banking/investment services) 
within  the  financial  conglomerate,  it  can  calculate  its  group-wide  capital  on  the  basis  of  the 
consolidated accounts.
187 In the absence of consolidated accounts, the FCD allows for a solo-plus 
supervision by means of aggregation and deduction.
188  
  The supplementary capital adequacy test for financial conglomerates is laid down in Article 6 
and  Annex  I  of  the  FCD.
189 The  FCD  includes  unregulated  financial  entities  in  the  scope  of 
supplementary supervision, which may not be subject to capital regulation on a stand-alone basis.
190 
A  notional  solvency  requirement  is  calculated  for  the  unregulated  entity,  which  equals  the 
hypothetical  capital  requirement  such  an  entity  would  have  to  comply  with  under  the  relevant 
sectoral rules if it were a regulated entity of that particular financial sector. In order to ensure that 
                                                 
180   Joint Forum (2001a), p. 11, para. 2. 
181   The efficient sectoral supervision on a stand-alone basis is considered to be a compulsory prerequisite for an efficient 
supervision of financial conglomerates, cf. also European Commission (2000), p. 19. 
182   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 43. 
183   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 43. 
184   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 107. 
185   Tripartite Group (1995), para. 43. 
186   Annex I, Section I. 1(i) FCD; European Commission (2001), p. 4. 
187   Article 6(4) FCD and Method 1 (accounting consolidation) in Annex I FCD. 
188   Methods 2 and 3 in Annex I FCD. 
189   In Germany, the relevant norms are: § 10b Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) and § 104q Insurance Supervision Act 
(Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) in conjunction with the Regulation on the adequacy of own funds of financial 
conglomerates (Verordnung über die Angemessenheit der Eigenmittelausstattung von Finanzkonglomeraten). 
190   For instance, mixed financial holding companies pursuant to Article 6(3)(d) FCD.  
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financial conglomerates maintain sufficient capital at the group level, a coordinator
191 is appointed 
and entrusted with the task to oversee the maintenance of the group-wide capital at least once per 
year. 
  The FCD provides for four technical methods for the calculation of the group-wide regulatory 
capital.  The  calculation  methods  have  been  largely  developed  by  the  Joint  Forum  in  its  capital 
adequacy  study  of  1999
192 and  have  been  adopted  by  the  FCD  with  slight  differences  in 
terminology.
193 The calculation methods comprise the accounting consolidation method (Method 1), 
the deduction and aggregation method (Method 2), the book value and/or requirement deduction 
method (Method 3) and lastly a combination of all methods (Method 4). It remains at the discretion 
of the coordinator to determine which calculation method shall be applied in practice.  
  The group entities included in the scope of the computation of regulatory capital are as 
follow
194: (i) credit institutions, financial institutions or ancillary banking services undertakings within 
the meaning of the CRD; (ii) insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings or insurance holding 
companies  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1(i)  of  Directive  (98/78/EC);  (iii)  investment  firms  or 
financial institutions within the meaning of Article 4(1)(1) of the Directive (2004/39/EC); and (iv) 
mixed financial holding companies
195.  
  All FCD calculation methods should in principle yield broadly equivalent results if applied to 
any financial conglomerate. The following example intends to examine the adequacy of the first 
three calculation methods in the FCD. The fourth calculation method allows competent authorities to 
combine the first three methods in certain cases, which allows for national discretion and can differ 
largely depending on the individual conglomerate structure. As the objective of this analysis is not to 
address the differences in national rules and options but to assess the general adequacy of the FCD 
capital requirements, the fourth method will be excluded in this exercise. The assessment is carried 
out on the basis of the following example:   
Assume A-Bank is the parent company of B-Bank and C-Insurance (ABC Group). A-Bank owns 100 % of 
B-Bank  and  owns  80  %  of  C-Insurance.  The  actually  maintained  capital  and  the  required  sectoral 
regulatory capital are as indicated below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6
196 
 
                                                 
191   Under the FCD, the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates is mainly exercised by the so-called 
coordinator, who will be appointed from among the competent authorities of the Member States concerned in 
accordance with the criteria set out in the Directive. The tasks of the coordinator include inter alia the assessment of 
the financial conglomerate’s compliance with the supplementary rules on capital adequacy (Articles 10 and 11 FCD). 
192   Included in Joint Forum (2001a). 
193   European Commission (2000), p. 19. 
194   Pursuant to Article 6 (3) FCD in the manner and to the extent defined in Annex I of the FCD. 
195   A mixed financial holding company means an unregulated parent undertaking, which together with its subsidiaries, at 
least one of which is a regulated entity with its head office in the EU, and other entities, constitute a financial 
conglomerate.  
196   Barth/Maaser (2003), p. 67. 
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2.1.  Accounting consolidation method  
  The  accounting  consolidation  method  essentially  compares  the  consolidated  capital  of  a 
financial conglomerate to the sum of the regulatory capital requirements for each group member. 
Under  this  method,  the  capital  of  a  financial  conglomerate  is  calculated  on  the  basis  of  its 
consolidated  accounts  by  applying  the  corresponding  sectoral  rules  on  the  form  and  extent  of 
consolidation (Article 6(4) FCD). The supplementary capital requirement for a financial conglomerate 
is that (a) the own funds of the financial conglomerate calculated upon the consolidated position of 
the  group  must  be  at  least  equal  to  (b)  the  sum of  the  capital  requirements  for  each  different 
financial sector calculated in accordance with the corresponding sectoral rules, including notional 
requirements for non-regulated financial sector entities in the calculation.
197 The difference between 
the consolidated capital and the aggregated sectoral capital requirements may not be negative.  
  Under European legislation, this method represents a technique which is applied to banking 
groups  comprising  investment  firms.  An  undercapitalisation  under  this  method  will  occur  if  the 
capital of a financial conglomerate will substantially diminish due to the consolidation. A prerequisite 
of  this  method  is,  however,  that  the  financial  conglomerate  holds  consolidated  accounts.  The 
application of the accounting consolidation method to the above example results in the following 
calculation:  
Accounting Consolidation Method 
 
  Capital Parent  540 
+  Capital Subsidiary 1  160 
+  Capital Subsidiary 2  100 
−  Book value Subsidiaries 1 and 2  180 
=  Consolidated capital  620 
     
  Capital requirement Parent  300 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 1  150 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 2  50 
=  Sum of all sectoral capital requirements   500 
     
⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒  Difference of both sums  +120 
Figure 7
198 
  The accounting consolidation method allows the inclusion of third-party shares in the capital 
of subsidiaries. The difference between the consolidated capital of the financial conglomerate (= 620) 
and the sum of the sectoral capital requirements (= 500) equals 120. Under this calculation method, 
the exemplified financial conglomerate meets its capital requirements both at the sectoral as well as 
the group level, holding a capital excess of 120.  
 
2.2.  Deduction and aggregation method 
  The  calculation of  the  capital  adequacy  under  the  deduction  and  aggregation  method  is 
carried out on the basis of the individual accounts of each entity in a financial conglomerate. The 
supplementary capital adequacy requirement is that (a) the sum of  the own funds of each regulated 
and non-regulated entity in the financial conglomerate is at least equal to (b) the sum of  the capital 
requirements of each regulated and non-regulated entity and the book value of participations in 
other entities of the group, again including notional requirements for non-regulated financial sector 
entities in the calculation.
199 The application of this method to the above example results in the 
following calculation:  
                                                 
197   Method 1 in Annex I FCD. 
198   Barth/Maaser (2003), p. 67. 
199   Method 2 in Annex I FCD.  
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Deduction and Aggregate Method 
 
  Capital Parent  540 
+  Capital Subsidiary 1  160 
+  Capital Subsidiary 2 (proportional)  80 
−  Book value Subsidiaries 1 and 2  180 
=  Sum of all capital  600 
     
  Capital requirement Parent  300 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 1  150 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 2 (proportional)  40 
=  Sum of all sectoral capital requirements   490 
     
⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒  Difference of both sums  +110 
Figure 8
200 
  Under the deduction and aggregation method, the difference between the aggregated sum 
of  capital  held  by  all  group  entities  (=  600)  and  the  aggregated  sum  of  all  sectoral  capital 
requirements (= 490) equals 110. Again, the exemplified financial conglomerate meets its capital 
requirements both at the sectoral and the group level and holds a capital excess of 110.  
 
2.3.  Book value and/or requirement deduction method 
  The calculation of regulatory capital under the book value and/or requirement deduction 
method is based on separate accounts of each entity in a financial conglomerate. Under this method, 
(a) the own funds of the parent undertaking or the entity at the head of the financial conglomerate 
must be at least equal to the sum of (b) the capital requirement of the parent undertaking or the 
head as referred to above and the higher of either (i) the book value of the former’s participation in 
other entities in the group or (ii) those entities’ capital requirements.
201 The latter is to be considered 
proportionally and again, a notional solvency requirement for non-regulated financial sector entities 
shall be calculated. The application of this method to the above example results in the following 
calculation: 
Book Value/Requirement Deduction Method 
 
  Capital Parent  540 
     
  Capital requirement Parent  300 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 1  150 
+  Capital requirement Subsidiary 2 (proportional)  40 
=  Sum of all sectoral capital requirements   490 
     
⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒  Difference of both sums  +50 
Figure 9
202 
  As the capital requirements for the subsidiaries (= 150+40) are higher than the book value of 
the parent’s participation in the subsidiaries (= 180), the subsidiaries’ capital requirements were used 
in this calculation. Under this method, the difference between the parent’s capital and the sum of 
the  parent’s  capital  requirements  and  the  subsidiaries’  capital  requirements  equals  50.  The 
exemplified financial conglomerate again meets its capital requirements both at the sectoral and the 
group level. However, the capital excess at the group level only amounts to 50, which presents less 
than half of the excess amount available to the group under the previous two calculation methods. 
 
                                                 
200   Barth/Maaser (2003), p. 68. 
201   Method 3 in Annex I FCD. 
202   Barth/Maaser (2003), p. 67.  
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2.4.  Adequacy of the methods 
  All  three  FCD  calculation  methods  are  intended  to  be  equal  in  applicability.  It  is  at  the 
discretion  of  the  coordinator  to  decide,  after  consultation  with  the  other  relevant  competent 
authorities and the concerned financial conglomerate itself, which method shall be applied in each 
individual case.
203  
  The purpose of the above calculation test is to determine the adequacy of the calculation 
methods stipulated in the FCD. This can be answered in the affirmative if the application of all three 
methods to any financial conglomerate would yield broadly equivalent and consistent results. From 
the above calculations, however, it is evident that the methods do not lead to identical results. While 
the computed amount of capital excess at the group level under Method 1 (= 120) and Method 2 (=  
110) are similar and comparable, the calculation result of Method 3 (= 50) is less than half of the 
results computed under the other two methods respectively. Method 3 therefore raises concerns as 
to its adequacy for the assessment of capital at the group-wide level of a financial conglomerate. 
Method 1 appears to be advantageous as it allows accounting for third-party shares in the capital of 
subsidiaries when computing the consolidated capital of the group, which has the effect of increasing 
the amount of regulatory capital held by the conglomerate. 
 
3.  JCFC’s advice on capital regulation of financial conglomerates 
  The transposition process of the FCD into national law has shown that the application of the 
supplementary FCD rules can be difficult due to the disparate underlying regulatory requirements of 
the banking and the insurance sectors. In order to further facilitate and improve the application of 
the FCD, the European Commission has requested technical advice from the JCFC on three topics 
since 2007.
204 The first call for technical advice on capital adequacy of financial conglomerates has 
resulted in (i) a comparison report of the capital instruments that are eligible as regulatory capital in 
the banking, securities and insurance sectors (the first JCFC Report)
205, (ii) an impact assessment of 
sectoral differences for the supervision of financial conglomerates (the second JCFC Report)
206 and (iii) 
recommendations for actions which the JCFC considers appropriate to address the consequences of 
the differences identified in the preceding analyses (the third JCFC Report)
207.  
 
3.1.  The first JCFC report 
  The first JCFC report of January 2007 aimed at identifying the similarities and differences 
between the capital instruments eligible for the European banking, securities and insurance sectors. 
It concluded that while the eligible capital elements in the distinct financial sectors share a lot of 
commonalities, in particular as regards the principles (e.g. goal, purpose, main characteristics), there 
still remains a high level of differences which can generally be divided into two types. The first 
reflects differences that derive from the distinct nature of the traditional business and risks prevalent 
in  the  respective  financial  sector.  For  instance,  unrealised  profits  and  revaluation  reserves  are 
considered to belong to this category. While they qualify as eligible capital instruments in both the 
banking  and  the  insurance  sector,  the  extent  to  which  those  reserves  are  included  in  the 
computation of the regulatory capital differ substantially. Revaluation reserves are considered as 
additional own funds and accepted to a certain limit in the banking sector, while there is no limit to 
their inclusion in the insurance sector.
208 Capital elements which are truly specific to each sector such 
                                                 
203   Annex I FCD. 
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as profit reserves for life insurers or short-term subordinated loan capital for banks also fall into this 
category of  difference.  The  different  treatment of such  capital  elements  is acknowledged  to  be 
necessary, reasoned by the different nature of business and risk management methods applied in the 
distinct sectors.
209 The second type of difference is unrelated to the sectoral business or risk profiles 
and therefore regarded as dispensable and detrimental, potentially leading to regulatory arbitrage 
opportunities.
210  
  The JCFC identified four key differences with regard to the sectoral rules on the eligibility of 
capital  instruments  as  regulatory  capital.  They  concern  the  treatment  of  unrealised  profits  and 
revaluation reserves, the treatment of hybrids, the thresholds for deductions, and the consolidation 
approaches and methods. At the time of the publication of this report, hybrid capital instruments, i.e. 
capital elements that have features of both equity and debt, had not yet been explicitly addressed by 
sectoral  EU  directives  but  were  considered  relevant  due  to  their  growing  importance.
211 In  the 
absence of an EU-wide regulation, hybrids used to be recognised as eligible for original own funds of 
banks in some Member States up to 15 % in accordance with the Sydney Press Release
212 on the 
basis of three main criteria, namely permanence, loss absorption and flexibility of payments.
213 In the 
insurance sector, hybrids were only considered as eligible capital instruments where they were in 
excess of the required solvency margins. The absence of any international or European accepted 
minimum requirements comparable to the Sydney Press Release in the insurance sector had induced 
some Member States to adopt the principles established in the Sydney Press Release as a basis for 
the treatment of hybrids in insurance undertakings.
214  
  As regards the capital computation methods for homogeneous financial groups, the JCFC 
established that a large degree of commonalities can be found in the principles of group supervision 
of the different sectors. The fundamental objective of group capital regulation is identical for both 
banking and insurance sectors, namely the elimination of double or multiple gearing and intra-group 
creation of capital.
215 Nonetheless, substantial differences were identified in respect of the scope of 
consolidation  and  the  method  of  calculation.
216 Banking  groups  are  subject  to  consolidated 
supervision  and  the  group  capital  is  generally  computed  on  the  basis  of  consolidated  financial 
statements  prepared  for  statutory  accounting
217  while  insurance  groups  are  subject  to 
supplementary supervision.
218  
 
3.2.  The second JCFC report 
  In its second report of August 2007, the JCFC aimed at assessing the extent to which the 
identified four key differences can impact the composition and the amount of regulatory capital of 
financial conglomerates. The JCFC undertook a quantitative analysis based on a set of hypothetical 
numerical examples which covers the aforementioned three calculation methods of the FCD. The 
fourth method, which allows a combination of the three calculation methods, was excluded. Further, 
the  study  did  not  account  for  differences  that  can  occur  at  national  level  due  to  different 
                                                 
209   JCFC (2007a), para. 40. 
210   JCFC (2007a), para. 41. 
211   The treatment of hybrids as eligible capital instrument within original own funds was introduced in the EU in the 
context of the CRD II Review, supra p. 11, footnote 76. 
212   BIS Press release of 27 October 1998 on “Instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital”, available at: 
http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm. 
213   JCFC (2007a), paras. 155-164. 
214   JCFC (2007a), para. 166. 
215   JCFC (2007a), paras. 316-317. 
216   JCFC (2007a), para. 319. 
217   See Articles 71, 133 Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) and Article 2 Capital Adequacy Directive (2006/49/EC); JCFC 
(2007a), paras. 365-366. 
218   The disparate approach with regard to group supervision has been harmonised to a great extent by the Solvency II 
reform.  
 
 
30 
transposition of the relevant sectoral directives and different interpretations of the FCD. The JCFC 
applied  the  banking  capital  requirements  and  the  insurance  solvency  margin  requirements  to  a 
hypothetical  simplified  balance  sheet  of  a  financial  conglomerate.  Two  “building  blocks”  were 
designed to capture potential basic structures of a financial conglomerate: The first building block 
dealt with a “mother-daughter” conglomerate structure in order to find out to what extent the 
situation differs where a bank or an insurance undertaking is at the top of a financial conglomerate 
respectively. The second building block was designed to examine how participations were accounted 
for in a “step-mother” relationship in view of the different thresholds for participation deductions in 
each sector.  
  The report established that the key sectoral differences identified in the first JCFC report can 
indeed  have  an  impact  on  the  composition  and  the  amount  of  regulatory  capital  of  a  financial 
conglomerate. In addition, it clarified that all three calculation methods of the FCD do not increase, 
alleviate nor eliminate the differences in capital which are driven by the sectoral differences.
219 The 
following  sectoral  differences  were  flagged  in  the  context  of  the  calculation  of  a  financial 
conglomerate’s group capital: 
  (i) Hybrids (also referred to as innovative instruments) in the banking sector are recognised as 
eligible original own funds in some Member States up to 15 % in accordance with the Sydney Press 
Release while they  are  not explicitly  recognised  in  the  insurance sector.  Subordinated  loans are 
recognised up to 100 % of original own funds of a bank while they are only recognised up to 50 % of 
the required or available solvency margin in the insurance sector. As a result, a higher amount of 
hybrids and subordinated loans may be used in the banking sector for the composition of regulatory 
capital.  
  (ii) Unrealised gains on assets (e.g. latent gains on real estate) are not recognised as eligible 
capital instruments in the banking sector at all or in some cases only to a limited extent. However, 
they are recognised as eligible elements without limit (subject to prior supervisory approval) in the 
insurance sector. Revaluation reserves are subject to a limit as additional own funds in the banking 
sector while they are included in the insurance sector without any limit. These differences were 
considered to be justified by the different nature of the sectoral business.  
  (iii)  It  was  clarified  that  the  different  sectoral  treatment  of  holdings  in  other  financial 
institutions within the conglomerate also has an impact on the calculation of the capital of a financial 
conglomerate. A holding in a bank between 10 % and 20 % is not automatically deducted if it is held 
by an insurance undertaking while it would be deducted if it were to be held by a bank within a 
financial conglomerate. 
  (iv) The study showed that the sectoral differences in consolidation approaches and methods 
can  impact  the  results  under  the  FCD  Method  1  and  Method  2.
220 The  JCFC  flagged  that  when 
comparing all three FCD calculation methods, Method 3 produced distorted results depending on 
whether the parent of a financial conglomerate is an insurance undertaking or a bank while under 
the first two methods this did not have an impact on the outcome of the computation.
221  
  It was suggested that the identified sectoral differences in types of eligible capital elements 
and the differences in the limits on the inclusion of eligible items may influence the placing of assets 
and  transactions  within  a  financial  conglomerate.  However,  this  assumption  was  repudiated  by 
industry  participants  and  no  strong  evidence  could  be  established  that  financial  conglomerates 
actually take advantage of the existing differences in order to realise regulatory arbitrages.
222  
                                                 
219   JCFC (2007b), para. 7. 
220   JCFC (2007b), para. 8. 
221   JCFC (2007b), para. 9. 
222   JCFC (2007b), paras. 8, 12.  
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  Industry participants advocated a more consistent approach within sectors and pointed out 
that the differences in national implementation of the sectoral directives may be greater than the 
differences between the sectoral directives themselves. They indicated that they did not consider 
sectoral differences to be the main drivers for capital management and communicated no strong 
opinion on the priorities for cross-sectoral harmonisation.
223 
 
3.3.  The third JCFC report 
  The  JCFC  published  a  third  report  in  April  2008,  in  which  it  focused  on  the  four  main 
differences identified in the previous studies and offered the following recommendations: 
  (i) As regards hybrids, the JCFC proposed a cross-sectorally harmonised treatment of hybrid 
instruments  as  an  eligible  capital  element  and  to  maintain  the  principles  and  requirements  for 
eligibility common, unless required by sectoral specificities.
224  
  (ii)  The  different  sectoral  treatment  of  revaluation  reserves  and  unrealised  gains  is 
considered to be justified by sectoral differences. The JCFC therefore recommended focusing on 
consistent implementation of the sectoral directives at the national level for the time being.
225  
  (iii) The underlying sectoral rules for banks and insurance undertakings are identical with 
regard to the mandatory deduction of holdings if the held entity is an insurance undertaking but 
contain  different  limits  when  the  held  entity  is  a  bank.  If  the  parent  company  is  an  insurance 
undertaking, its holding, either in a bank or an insurance, will be mandatorily deducted if it exceeds 
20 % of the held entity’s capital or, if less, in case of a durable link. If the parent company is a bank, 
its holding in a bank is deducted if it exceeds 10 % of the held entity’s capital or, if less, as far as the 
aggregated  amount  of  smaller  holdings  exceeds  10  %  of  the  parent’s  capital.  The  JCFC  did  not 
provide any specific explanation for the regulatory gap in the treatment of holdings or participations 
and recommended to still further gather evidence of potential regulatory arbitrage.
226  
  (iv) Finally, the JCFC proposed Method 1 of the FCD (accounting consolidation method) as the 
default  method.  This  approach  would  be  consistent  with  the  banking  sector  and  also  with  the 
insurance sector as the accounting consolidation method was proposed in the Solvency II reform. 
However,  the  supervisory  authorities  should  have  the  discretion  to  require  the  application  of 
Method 2 in certain cases. As regards Method 3, the JCFC concluded that it is too simplistic and can 
deliver doubtful results.
227  
 
4.  Legislative changes towards a more effective capital regulation 
  In  view  of  the  above  findings  of  the  JCFC,  it  seems  important  to  examine  whether  the 
currently ongoing review work of the CRD and the newly adopted Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) 
take the recommendations of the JCFC into account and offer more harmonised sectoral rules where 
necessary and appropriate.  
  Hybrids have gained large popularity in recent years because they allow banks and insurances 
to raise funds in a cost-efficient and less dilutive way.
228 The previous lack of legislation on hybrids at 
the EU level has led to diverging eligibility criteria and limits for hybrids across sectors as well as 
borders.  The  JCFC  pointed  out  in  its  studies  that the  non-harmonised  treatment of  hybrids  can 
impede an effective capital regulation of financial conglomerates.  
                                                 
223   JCFC (2007b), para. 12. 
224   JCFC (2008), paras. 12, 13, 57. 
225   JCFC (2008), para. 68. 
226   JCFC (2008), para. 89. 
227   JCFC (2008), paras. 91, 105. 
228   JCFC (2008), para. 42. The volume of hybrids in the banking sector was estimated at around 213 billion EUR, which 
represents about 11.5 % of total eligible own funds as of 31 December 2006 (source: CEBS (2008a), para. 2).  
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  In the banking sector, the European legislator has recently adopted a new directive
229 in the 
context of the CRD II Review which introduces explicit rules with regard to the inclusion of hybrids 
into banks’ original own funds. The new provisions are largely based on the CEBS’s advice
230 to the 
European Commission on a common EU definition of tier 1 hybrids. It is not by a list of specific 
instruments but by means of principles that hybrids are defined eligible. The new Article 63a of the 
Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) stipulates the key criteria for the eligibility of hybrids as original own 
funds to be permanence
231, loss absorbency
232 and flexibility of payments
233. The new Article 66(1a) 
sets out limits for the inclusion of such instruments.
234 Following the adoption of the new rules on 
hybrids in the CRD, the CEBS released implementation guidelines for hybrid capital instruments on 
10 December 2009.
235 The guidelines aim at complementing the new CRD provisions and provide for 
more  detailed  instructions  on  the  key  criteria  (permanence,  loss  absorption  and  flexibility  of 
payments), on the limits as well as on hybrids issued through a special purpose vehicle which has not 
been addressed in the CRD.  
  In  the  insurance  sector,  the  newly  adopted  Solvency  II  Directive  (2009/138/EC)  has 
introduced a new classification system of own funds based on a three-tier system. Eligible capital 
elements  are  defined  according  to the  criteria  loss  absorbency  on  a  going-concern  basis  and  in 
liquidation,  permanence,  subordination  as  well  as  absence  of  incentives  to  redeem,  absence  of 
mandatory  servicing  costs  and  absence  of  encumbrances.
236 According  to  these  criteria,  which 
resemble the key eligibility criteria of the banking sector, hybrids can be included as eligible capital 
and classified as tier 1, 2 or 3 basic own funds or tier 2 or 3 ancillary own funds depending on their 
financial characteristics. In order to meet the highest quality of own funds, i.e. tier 1 basic own funds, 
capital instruments must be permanently available and subordinated in case of liquidation.
237 It is 
interesting to note that in the Fourth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4)
238 it was established that the 
majority of hybrid capital instruments in practice was reported as tier 2 capital and not tier 1 mainly 
because they did not satisfy the loss absorbency requirements and criteria relating to permanence.
239 
In contrast to the amended CRD, the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) does not expressly regulate 
the treatment of hybrids but they are captured by the general provisions regulating own funds. The 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) is involved in the 
work related to the development of level 2 implementing measures and level 3 supervisory guidance 
                                                 
229   Supra footnote 76. 
230   CEBS (2008a). 
231   The instrument must be permanently available so that there is no doubt that it can support depositors and other 
creditors in times of stress (source: European Commission (2008), Accompanying document, SEC(2008) 2533, p. 4, 
footnote 10). 
232   The instrument must be available to absorb losses, both on a going concern basis and in liquidation, and to provide 
support for depositors’ funds if necessary (source: European Commission (2008), Accompanying document, SEC(2008) 
2533, p. 4, footnote 8). 
233   The instrument must contain features permitting the noncumulative deferral or cancellation of payment of coupons 
or dividends in times of stress (source: European Commission (2008), Accompanying document, SEC(2008) 2533, p. 4, 
footnote 9). 
234   Hybrids which are convertible into equity capital in emergency situation or at the request of competent authority can 
be included up to 50 % of original own funds while all other hybrid instruments cannot exceed a maximum limit of 
35 %. Hybrids with a moderate incentive to redeem are limited to 15 % of an institution’s original own funds. 
235   The newly amended CRD explicitly requests CEBS to elaborate guidelines for the convergence of supervisory practices 
with regard to hybrids (Article 63a(6) Banking Directive (2006/48/EC), as newly amended). The guidelines are 
available at: http://www.c-ebs.org/documents/Publications/Standards---Guidelines/2009/Hybrids/Guidelines.aspx. 
236   Article 93 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
237   Articles 94(1) and 93(1)(a)/(b) Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
238   QIS are simulations, performed by insurers on a voluntary basis, of the impact of the proposed new requirements on 
their financial resources. These have been run by CEIOPS on the request of the European Commission. 
239   QIS4 Report (2008), p. 140.  
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of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) in the context of the Lamfalussy procedure.
240 It remains 
to be examined to what extent the requirements in the insurance sector will be consistent with those 
of the banking sector in order to provide for a harmonised cross-sectoral treatment of hybrids in the 
EU. At this point in time, it can be concluded that the principles in relation to the inclusion of hybrids 
in the banking and insurance sectors seem to have been sufficiently aligned.  
  As already indicated in the third JCFC report, the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) has 
adopted the accounting consolidation-based method as the default method for the calculation of the 
solvency of insurance groups.
241 The deduction and aggregation method has been adopted as an 
alternative method.
242 The adoption of these calculation methods is positive as it brings the solvency 
calculation  methods  of  insurance  groups  in  line  with  those  of  the  banking  sector  and  thereby 
provides a common ground for the FCD’s top-up calculation methods.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
  The  key  objective  of  financial  regulation  and  supervision  is  to  ensure  that  financial 
institutions  operate  in  a  safe  and  sound  manner,  which  allows  to  protect  their  customers  and 
creditors and to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Only a stable financial system is 
capable of fulfilling its function of efficient and low-cost transformation and provision of financial 
resources.  One  of  the  key  instruments  financial  authorities  have  at  hand  in  regulating  financial 
activities is to require financial institutions to maintain an adequate level of capital. The regulation of 
capital in each financial sector deals with different supervisory approaches, different definitions of 
capital, different types of risks and different capital requirements.  
  Recent developments and changes in the financial landscape have induced the emergence of 
financial conglomerates which unify banking/investment and insurance businesses under one roof. 
The cross-sectoral activities of financial conglomerates and the risks resulting thereof require that 
they are subject to a special supervision in addition to the sectoral supervision of individual group 
entities. In particular, several studies have identified that the lack of cross-sectoral capital regulation 
of financial conglomerates gives rise to prudentially relevant risks, which primarily arise from the use 
of double/multiple gearing, the use of excessive capital leveraging technique and the employment of 
unregulated entities. In order to capture those risks, a group-wide capital regulation is necessary, 
which can prevent financial conglomerates from taking advantage of the asymmetries between the 
sectoral capital requirements.  
  The EU legislator adopted the FCD in 2004, which provides for a supplementary supervisory 
framework for financial conglomerates, including additional capital requirements. The FCD provides 
three calculation methods for the computation of an adequate level of regulatory capital of financial 
conglomerates,  namely  the  accounting  consolidation  method  (Method  1),  the  deduction  and 
aggregation method (Method 2) and the book value and/or requirement deduction method (Method 
3). As indicated in Part 2 III 2. 2.3., Method 3 raises concerns as to its accuracy and adequacy for the 
assessment of the group-wide capital of a financial conglomerate. In line with this result, the JCFC 
highlighted in its studies that Method 3 of the FCD is too simplistic and delivers distorted results and 
assessed it to be an inadequate calculation method. The JCFC recommended Method 1 as the default 
method while Method 2 should be kept as an alternative method for certain cases. Consistent with 
this recommendation and with the calculation method for banking groups, the Solvency II Directive 
(2009/138/EC) has adopted the accounting consolidation-based method as the default method for 
the calculation of the solvency margin of insurance groups while the deduction and aggregation 
                                                 
240   The time table for the development of the level 2 implementing measures and level 3 guidelines is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency/index_en.htm. 
241   Article 230 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC). 
242   Article 233 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) (2009/138/EC).  
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method has been adopted as an alternative method. The adoption of these calculation methods for 
insurance groups contributes to a harmonised cross-sectoral approach of group capital requirements 
in the EU and to an enhanced application of capital requirements of financial conglomerates. 
  Another important sectoral difference which can potentially have a negative impact on the 
capital  regulation  of  financial  conglomerates  concerns  the  different  cross-sectoral  treatment  of 
hybrids. The JCFC proposed a cross-sectorally harmonised treatment of hybrid instruments as eligible 
capital instruments and to maintain the principles and requirements for eligibility common unless 
required by sectoral specificities. The CRD II Review and the Solvency II Review have taken account of 
this lack of regulation and introduced similar principles as regards the inclusion of hybrids in the 
composition and the amount of regulatory capital. Unlike the newly amended CRD, the Solvency II 
Directive (2009/138/EC) does not expressly regulate hybrids. As the implementing work at the level 2 
and level 3 (Lamfalussy procedure) is currently ongoing, it remains to be examined whether the 
sectoral rules on hybrids will be sufficiently harmonised at the cross-sectoral level. A cross-sectorally 
harmonised approach will certainly contribute to a more enhanced capital regulation of financial 
conglomerates.  
  Overall, the FCD’s capital regulatory framework seems capable of capturing and eliminating 
the core risks that are associated with the capital regulation of financial conglomerates. It accounts 
for the risk of regulatory arbitrage and includes unregulated entities in the computation of regulatory 
capital. Other conglomerate unique risks such as systemic risk or concentration risk, however, are 
not  taken  into  account  in  the  capital  regulatory  framework.  It  remains  to  be  further  examined 
whether those risks can have a substantial impact on the financial solidity of financial conglomerates 
to the extent that they need to be covered by the regulatory capital of financial conglomerates. 
  An adequate capital regulatory framework alone seems not sufficient in order to ensure the 
safety and soundness of financial instiutions. The 2007-2009 crisis has demonstrated that a heavy 
reliance on capital requirements can be misleading. It has in particular highlighted the importance of 
liquidity  and  risk  management.  In  order  for  financial  institutions  to  understand  and  adequately 
manage their risks, they need to have an appropriate risk measurement and management in place. 
For  financial  conglomerates  specifically,  a  group-wide  central  risk  management  system  seems 
essential, which can implement appropriate mechanisms to quantify all risks that are assumed by the 
group. Other qualitative elements such as enhanced cooperation between supervisors and better 
exchange  of  information,  both  cross-sectorally  and  cross-border,  seem  vital  in  any  attempt  to 
suppress  regulatory  arbitrage.
243 The  recent  developments  in  the  creation  of  a  unified  financial 
supervisor at the national level which integrates all financial sectors in one supervisory instance
244 
was motivated by the goal to create a more efficient supervisory body which can make use of its 
universal  knowledge  of  the  financial  industry.  Such  institutional  consolidation  may  possibly 
contribute to a better supervision over financial conglomerates as a whole.  
  Capital  adquacy  regulation  of  financial  conglomerates  is  a  highly  complex  issue  which 
requires the consideration of the underyling sectoral capital requirements at the entity level as well 
as the inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative supervisory elements at the group level. It also 
requires a cross-sectoral and oftentimes a cross-border perspective. Capital adequacy regulation of 
financial conglomerates in the EU also needs to consider different national implementation of the 
conglomerate directive and the sectoral directives as well as different supervisory approaches and 
institutional set-up at the national level. Keeping these diverse levels and aspects in mind, it can be 
conluded that the capital framework of the FCD addresses the risks associated with an adequate 
                                                 
243   Tripartite Group (1995), pp. 34-35. 
244   The British Financial Services Authority (FSA) set up under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000; the 
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA) in Austria since 2001; the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) 
in Germany since 2002.  
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capital regulation of financial conglomerates and provides a suitable legal ground for the capital 
regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU. As the FCD serves as a top-up framework to the 
capital requirements at the sectoral level, sectoral harmonisation seems important, where necessary 
and appropriate, in order to ensure an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates. 
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